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ABSTRACT 
The long-term effects of hedge fund activism are controversial. Some 
empirical studies document that activism is associated with increased 
long-term firm value, suggesting that activists can better discipline 
management. Other studies, however, challenge these results, arguing that 
the incorporation of possible selection effects exposes activism as 
detrimental to long-term firm value.  
This Article contributes to this ongoing debate, producing novel 
empirical evidence on the relationship between activist campaigns, the 
financial value of firms, key governance arrangements, and corporate 
legal rules. We first document qualitative evidence that untargeted 
“control” firms sharing similar characteristics to targeted firms perform 
better in the long term than the target firms, and then show that hedge 
fund activism is associated with increased risk-taking but has no 
significant impact on managerial incentives. These combined findings 
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provide support for the view that the substantial private gains hedge funds 
realize through activism come at the expense of long-term firm value, 
rather than from increased managerial accountability. 
Consistent with these results, we further show that defensive 
mechanisms matter for deterring hedge fund activism only as long as they 
provide an effective higher-level constraint to protect a firm’s commitment 
to long-term value creation, such as when they are premised on 
shareholder consent or embedded in a managerial-friendly legal 
environment. This would explain why staggered boards and incorporation 
in states with more anti-takeover statutes can deter future activist 
interventions, while the poison pill, surprisingly, does not. The Article 
concludes with recommendations to enhance the deterrent effect of current 
defensive mechanisms against short-term hedge fund activism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Are activist hedge funds a “force for good,” targeting underperforming 
companies to bring about increased managerial accountability? Or are they 
professional arbitrageurs driven by short-term self-interest whose market 
power allows them to benefit at the expense of others? These questions 
relate not just to hedge fund activism itself, but pertain to the more 
fundamental debate over the appropriate division of authority between a 
corporation’s boards and its shareholders, a debate that has occupied 
corporate law scholars for decades.
1
 Activist hedge funds have reframed 
that debate in the past ten years, ostensibly bringing about a new class of 
“empowered shareholders” whose distinguishing trait is routine reliance 
on the proactive use of governance levers to achieve near-term investment 
objectives.
2
 It follows that if activist hedge fund campaigns could be 
shown to have beneficial effects for firm performance—as shareholder 
advocates argue—this would challenge the traditional board-centric model 
featuring limited shareholder governance rights. Conversely, if hedge fund 
activism were to emerge empirically as detrimental to targeted firms, this 
would undermine the case for shareholder empowerment, in spite of the 
increased favor it has received among both policymakers and market 
players in recent years.
3
  
This Article sheds light on the long-term effects of hedge fund 
activism, as well as their broader implications, using novel empirical 
 
 
 1. Discussions over the optimal allocation of power within the corporation can be traced back to 
the classic debate between Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd in the 1930s. See A. A. Berle, Jr., 
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931) (defending shareholder property 
rights); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 
1147–48 (1932) (advocating the merits of managerial discretion). 
 2. As put by Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock, “[h]edge funds come close to being the 
archetypal short-term investor. For some funds, holding shares for a full day represents a ‘long-term’ 
investment.” Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1083 (2007) (footnote omitted).  
 3. For a thorough discussion of these changes, see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled 
CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 995–1037 (2010). 
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evidence that bears on the relationship between the financial value of 
firms, activist campaigns, and key corporate governance arrangements and 
legal rules. This empirical evidence documents results supporting the view 
that the substantial private gains hedge funds realize through activism 
come at the expense of long-term firm value, rather than from the 
activists’ ability to hold managers more accountable. We therefore argue 
that shareholder advocates’ calls for reforms designed to advance the role, 
rights, and involvement of shareholders in corporate governance—based 
on the alleged benefits of hedge fund activism for firm performance
4—
should be rejected as unsupported by the data. 
Theoretically, the shareholder advocates’ view that hedge fund 
activism provides value-maximizing governance inputs rests on the 
assumption that shareholders, as the corporation’s residual claimants, are 
better placed than potentially “captured” boards to control the classic 
problem of managerial moral hazard.
5
 Viewed through this lens, activist 
hedge funds emerge as the champions of dispersed and diversified 
shareholders, who are less able to effectively use their governance rights to 
control this problem.
6
 In stark contrast, traditionalists defending the 
centrality of the board of directors argue that hedge funds are impatient 
investors, whose interventions are directed at boosting a target’s short-
term stock price, potentially at the expense of long-term value creation, 
rather than at bringing about increased managerial accountability.
7
 
In response, shareholder advocates have traditionally dismissed short-
termism concerns as theoretically weak in light of the pervasiveness of the 
moral hazard problem.
8
 However, as two of us have argued elsewhere, this 
counterargument fails to consider an additional principal-agent problem 
that arises in the shareholder-manager relationship—the shareholders’ 
“limited-commitment problem.”9 Because of their informational 
 
 
 4. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1085, 1091, 1148, 1155 (2015).  
 5. See infra Part I.A.1.  
 6. See infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra Part I.A.2.  
 8. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1651 (2013); cf. Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom 
and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977, 1004 (2013) (arguing that short-termism “is insufficiently 
strong, empirically and theoretically, to affect corporate rulemaking”).  
 9. See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 
68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 114–16 (2016); see also Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as a Time Machine: 
Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 685, 714–18 (2015) (investigating the distortions that imperfectly efficient markets may 
engender in shareholder incentives to support long-term corporate projects). As one of us discusses in 
a recent paper, the primitive information problem at the basis of the shareholders’ limited commitment 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss2/5
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disadvantage vis-à-vis firm insiders, shareholders—all shareholders as a 
matter of fact—may be unable to tell whether poor short-term firm 
outcomes (e.g., low current earnings) signal managerial underperformance 
or the undertaking of attractive long-term investments whose benefits will 
not materialize until later. As a result, in response to such poor short-term 
outcomes, shareholders may rationally decide to vote to remove the 
directors and managers or advocate some other drastic corporate changes 
such as the sale of the company. Fearing this sort of shareholder 
retribution, managers may thus develop inefficient incentives for short-
termist strategies.
10
 Within this theoretical framework, short-termism 
emerges as a much more pervasive problem than shareholder advocates 
acknowledge. Further, activist hedge funds naturally exacerbate the 
shareholders’ limited commitment problem, as they are more likely than 
other shareholders to intervene upon observing a short-term decline in 
earnings.  
Motivated by the theoretical debate’s contradictory claims, empirical 
studies on hedge fund activism have mainly focused on the impact of 
activist hedge fund campaigns on firm value.
11
 In particular, the latest 
frontier of these studies is the investigation of long-term valuations after 
the start of an activist hedge fund campaign. Indeed, attempting to 
measure long-term valuations is the only method that can address the main 
challenge raised by the critics of activism, according to which hedge funds 
would profit from activism at the expense of a firm’s long-term value.12 
Notably, in a recent study that had large echoes in the press, Lucian 
Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang documented evidence they argue 
rejects this claim.
13
 Using a dataset of approximately 2,000 interventions 
during the period 1994–2007, they concluded that the performance of the 
hedge funds’ targets on average continued to increase for up to five years 
after the start of the hedge fund campaigns.
14
  
 
 
problem is the problem of “adverse selection.” See Simone M. Sepe, Board and Shareholder Power, 
Revisited, 101 U. MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). Adverse selection arises because the agent has 
“‘hidden knowledge’ about her characteristics or the execution of the delegated task. Collectively, in 
the jargon of economists, this is known as the agent’s ‘type.’” Id. (manuscript at 16. Nobel laureate 
George Akerlof introduced the classic treatment of adverse selection in the products market. See 
George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 
Q.J. ECON. 488, 500 (1970). 
 10. Distortions may also affect long-term stakeholders who are required to make long-term 
specific investments. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 9, at 121–23. 
 11. The first comprehensive empirical study of hedge funds is Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund 
Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008).  
 12. See infra note 76. 
 13. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 4, at 1089. 
 14. See id. at 1090. 
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However, a primary challenge for empirical studies is to avoid 
selection effects that bias a dataset.
15
 Selection effects refer to the 
possibility that any observed change might be attributable to omitted 
factors that are related to the selection of the data—in this case to the fact 
that activist hedge funds do not randomly select which firms to target in 
their campaigns. Because the study by Bebchuk et al. (the “BBJ study”) 
documented that activist hedge funds tend to target companies that have 
been relatively poorly performing prior to the activist intervention,
16
 the 
possibility of selection effects seems particularly salient. For example, the 
observed subsequent improvements in firm value of the targets could be 
attributable to efforts undertaken directly by these firms to turn around 
performance, rather than to any disciplining effect from the activist hedge 
fund campaign itself.  
In response to this concern, two of us, along with Erasmo Giambona 
and Eric Wang, have reexamined the long-term association of hedge fund 
activism and firm value in a recent study (the “CGSW study”) that uses 
the same (though extended through time) dataset of the BBJ study but 
adopts a “matching” procedure.17 Using this empirical methodology, 
which is widely recognized as a primary way to address selection issues,
18
 
the long-term financial performance of firms targeted by hedge funds is 
compared to the long-term performance of a set of “control” firms.19 These 
firms are “matched” (i.e., selected) because they share essential 
characteristics with the targets in the period before the start of the activist 
hedge fund campaign, but they have not (yet) been targeted by activist 
hedge funds.
20
 Using matching, the CGSW study finds that firms targeted 
by activist hedge funds saw smaller gains in value in the years following 
the activist interventions than the group of control firms.
21
 It also found 
results consistent with the limited commitment view of hedge fund 
activism, documenting that the negative association between activist hedge 
fund campaigns and firm value is greater in firms with more long-term 
 
 
 15. See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 56–58 (7th ed. 2012).  
 16. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 4, at 1105–06. 
 17. See K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Hedge Fund Activism and Long-Term Firm Value (Nov. 24, 
2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://mcremers.nd.edu/assets/218219/cgsw_december_2015_hedge 
_fund_activism_and_long_term_firm_value.pdf.  
 18. See generally GUIDO W. IMBENS & DONALD B. RUBIN, CAUSAL INFERENCE FOR STATISTICS, 
SOCIAL, AND BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES 401–04 (2015). 
 19. See Cremers et al., supra note 17, at 14–20. 
 20. See id. at 14–17 (discussing matching criteria). 
 21. See id. at 17–20. 
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investments in research and development and firms with longer-term 
relationships with stakeholders.
22
  
This Article aims to further the understanding of the economic and 
legal mechanisms through which hedge funds’ activism influence firm 
value. We first consider whether there is any tradeoff in how hedge fund 
activism relates to the agency problems of managerial moral hazard and 
limited shareholder commitment. These problems are both important and 
not mutually exclusive, and therefore they could have heterogeneous 
effects on firms. For example, activist hedge fund campaigns could curb 
managerial moral hazard for some firms more than for others, potentially 
overcoming any exacerbation of the limited commitment problem and thus 
resulting in net positive effects for some subsets of firms. In order to 
explore this possibility, we focus on the relationship between activist 
hedge fund campaigns and corporate risk-taking, executive compensation, 
and the use of defensive legal measures—whether adopted at firm level or 
state level.
23
  
We begin by examining a specific channel through which activist 
hedge funds may realize short-term gains at the expense of long-term firm 
value, namely the increase in corporate risk-taking (as proxied by a firm’s 
bankruptcy risk). As taught by finance theory, increasing a firm’s level of 
risk transfers value from the existing fixed claimants to current equity 
claimants.
24
 In response, fixed claimants such as creditors are likely to 
raise a firm’s cost of debt in subsequent periods, with the end result that 
increased risk-taking can reduce overall firm value in the long term. For 
hedge funds, however, pursuing high-risk, high-return short-term 
strategies is likely to be individually rewarding, given their short-term 
investment horizons. In support of the limited commitment view of 
activism, for targets and control firms with similar ex-ante bankruptcy 
risk, we find that the bankruptcy risk of the targeted firms is significantly 
higher than that of the control firms in the first three years after the hedge 
fund’s intervention and continues to be so thereafter. Specifically, the 
average bankruptcy risk of the targets is 10% higher than that of the 
control firms in the first three years and 11% higher thereafter. 
 
 
 22. See id. at 22–27. 
 23. Methodologically, we investigate the relationship between activism and corporate risk-taking 
and executive compensation by using matched samples in order to compare targeted firms to ex-ante 
similar control firms. See infra Part III.B–C. For the relationship between activism and the use of 
several defensive measures, we instead use logit models to assess the likelihood that a firm might 
become a target conditional on such measures. See infra Part IV. 
 24. Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond 
Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118–19 (1979).  
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Next, we turn to executive compensation, which plays a crucial role in 
the managerial agency view of activism. Indeed, shareholder advocates 
have long described excessive executive pay (or “pay-without-
performance”) as providing the clearest evidence of the problems of board 
capture and managerial entrenchment.
25
 Further, and more pragmatically, 
activists routinely attack the use of allegedly excessive executive pay 
packages in their campaigns against underperforming targets.
26
 
Accordingly, if hedge fund activism offered a corrective to managerial 
moral hazard, we would expect to find that activist campaigns produce 
significant changes in the executive compensation of targeted firms 
relative to control firms. However, considering various dimensions of 
executive pay, we find no significant changes. This indicates that either 
the targets’ executives did not extract excessive pay before the activist 
intervention or, if they did, they continued to do so afterward—where both 
explanations weaken the view that hedge fund interventions are effective 
at disciplining entrenched managers. 
The central part of our empirical inquiry focuses on the relationship 
between hedge fund activism and various defensive legal measures. These 
measures have long been at the center of the debate on the appropriate 
division of power between boards and shareholders, largely because of the 
shareholder advocates’ claim that they promote value-decreasing 
managerial entrenchment.
27
 Weighing in on this debate, the BBJ study 
uses its result on the association of activism with long-term firm value to 
conclude that defensive measures such as the staggered board should be 
abandoned because they provide a significant impediment to value-
increasing hedge fund activism.
28
 This conclusion, however, is derived 
from a causal interpretation of the long-term increase in the value of 
targets after the start of activist hedge fund campaigns. But the CGSW 
study shows this interpretation to be unwarranted, exposing the results in 
the BBJ study as being not robust to the incorporation of selection effects.  
Further, under the managerial agency view of activism, defended by 
Bebchuk and other shareholder advocates, it is unclear why one would 
expect to observe less activism in firms with more defensive measures. 
Indeed, if defensive measures cause directors and managers to be 
significantly more entrenched, as these advocates argue, and if activism is 
beneficial to reduce such entrenchment, as they also argue, one would 
 
 
 25. See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.  
 26. See infra notes 152–55 and accompanying text.  
 27. See infra text accompanying notes 157–62.  
 28. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 4, at 1150. 
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expect to find more, rather than less activist interventions in firms that 
have adopted such measures. This would be the case because activists 
should expect to realize substantial efficiency gains by targeting firms 
with more entrenchment. The possible counterargument that the costs of 
removing any defensive measure exceed the prospective gains to activists 
also seems overstated in light of the powerful bargaining levers activists 
enjoy in the current corporate landscape and the increased ability they 
have gained to coerce boards to approve the removal of these measures.
29
 
Conversely, under the limited commitment view of activism, it seems 
reasonable to expect less activist interventions targeting firms with more 
defensive measures, as the use of such measures would signal a stronger 
firm commitment to long-term value creation and, hence, a higher 
likelihood that a board might defend vigorously against an activist attack.  
Our results on the relationship between various defensive measures and 
the likelihood of becoming the target of a future hedge fund intervention 
are consistent with these conjectures. We find that the likelihood of these 
interventions is substantially lower for firms that (i) are incorporated in a 
managerial-friendly state with more anti-takeover statutes, or (ii) have 
adopted a staggered board, as long as the firm is also incorporated in a 
managerial-friendly state. Conversely, the adoption of a poison pill is 
unrelated to the likelihood of a future hedge fund campaign. Under the 
managerial agency view of activism, we would have expected to find that 
activism is undeterred by the adoption of defensive measures (because 
activists would receive higher gains from targeting “more entrenched” 
firms) or that it is equally deterred by different defensive measures 
(because removing such measures would be too costly to activists). 
Instead, our results suggest that the adoption of such measures matter 
differently to activists depending on whether they provide an effective 
higher-level constraint to protect a firm’s commitment to long-term value 
creation. This would explain why the staggered board, which is generally 
premised on shareholder consent,
30
 could deter activism, while the poison 
pill, which can be unilaterally adopted by the board, could not. Indeed, 
shareholder consent to a defensive measure would signal to activists a 
higher likelihood that a firm might vigorously defend its commitment to 
 
 
 29. See, e.g., Cremers & Sepe, supra note 9, at 98–99 (documenting evidence on increased 
destaggering); Guhan Subramanian, Delaware’s Choice, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (2014) (attributing 
the rise of destaggering to shareholder activists and academic research); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius 
Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. 
CORP. L. 545, 556–57, 558–59 (2016) (discussing the decline of staggered boards and poison pills). 
 30. See Richard H. Koppes et al., Corporate Governance Out of Focus: The Debate Over 
Classified Boards, 54 BUS. LAW. 1023, 1029 (1999).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 261 Cremers et al book pages2/3/2017  
 
 
 
 
 
270 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:261 
 
 
 
 
the long term. In order to be credible, however, the protection provided by 
a staggered board needs to be “effective,” which in the current corporate 
scenario requires devices that can make it more difficult for activists to 
successfully pressure for destaggering, as occurs, for example, under the 
limits to shareholders rights provided by managerial-friendly 
legislations.
31
 
Overall, our new findings, combined with those in the CGSW study, 
provide strong support for the limited commitment view of activism, while 
simultaneously weakening the case for the managerial agency view. Based 
on these findings, this Article proposes that policymakers and institutional 
investors should seek changes to revitalize board authority to resist activist 
attacks. In particular, consistent with our empirical results on the use of 
defensive measures, we argue that it would be desirable to redesign such 
measures so that they re-enable boards to mount an effective pre-emptive 
strategy against the threat of an activist campaign.  
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the 
necessary background information on the current status of the theoretical 
and empirical debates on hedge fund activism, drawing on the prior 
research of two of us in the CGSW study to document the importance of 
selection effects in gauging the long-term association of hedge fund 
activism and firm value. Part II offers qualitative evidence to illustrate 
more concretely the changes activist campaigns produce in targeted firms 
relative to control firms with ex-ante similar characteristics. Part III 
presents novel empirical evidence on the relationship between hedge fund 
activism and, respectively, corporate risk-taking and executive 
compensation. Part IV presents novel evidence on the relationship 
between activism and the use of defensive measures. Part V discusses the 
policy implications of our analysis.  
I. HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM AND FIRM VALUE: WHERE DO WE STAND? 
Hedge fund activism is on the rise. In 2014 alone, activists launched 
344 campaigns against U.S. public companies (up from 291 in 2013).
32
 In 
 
 
 31. Our results also challenge recent studies that contest the relevance of anti-takeover statutes. 
These studies argue that these statutes would “add[] little, if anything, to the defensive arsenal of most 
firms” once one considers the stronger deterrent effects of the poison pill. Emiliano M. Catan & 
Marcel Kahan, The Law and Finance of Antitakeover Statutes, 68 STAN. L. REV. 629, 634 (2016). Our 
evidence, however, suggests that where the outside threat is represented by an activist campaign, anti-
takeover statutes offer a protective shield that the pill is unable to provide. See infra Part IV.C. 
 32. See ACTIVIST INSIGHT, ACTIVIST INVESTING—AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF TRENDS IN 
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 8, https://perma.cc/7FM4-CK7D (last visited Feb. 2, 2016).  
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the period 2010–2015, one S&P 500 company out of two has had an 
activist fund on its share register and one out of seven has been the target 
of an activist attack.
33
 As put by the Economist, “Americans encounter 
firms that activists have targeted when they brush their teeth (Procter & 
Gamble), answer their phone (Apple), log in to their computer (Microsoft, 
Yahoo and eBay), dine out (Burger King and PepsiCo) and watch 
television (Netflix).”34 Activists also seem to be attacking increasingly 
larger firms. Targeted firms with a market capitalization over $10 billion 
have doubled since 2012.
35
 In the past two years, hedge funds brought 
attacks on even bigger firms, including Bank of New York Mellon (market 
capitalization of about $45 billion), custodian for many of the world’s 
biggest banks; Allergan, Inc. (market capitalization of about $60 billion), a 
major pharmaceutical company; and Du Pont (market capitalization of 
over $60 billion), one of the oldest and most profitable U.S. companies.
36
  
The activists’ agenda, however, has remained largely unchanged. 
Increasing leverage, returning excess cash to shareholders, selling off non-
core corporate assets, and cutting operating costs have been among the 
most frequent demands of activists, together with the replacement of 
incumbent CEOs and other top executives, especially where the latter 
attempted to resist the activists’ requests.37 The tactics employed to pursue 
these agenda items have ranged from the mere exchange of 
communications with the board or management to publicly criticizing 
targeted companies, concluding private agreements to obtain board 
representation, or even extending hostile acquisition offers.
38
 Most 
frequently, however, hedge funds have pushed for desired changes by 
launching proxy fights or threatening to do so
39—typically seeking, and 
 
 
 33. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www.economist.com/ 
news/leaders/21642169-why-activist-investors-are-good-public-company-capitalisms-unlikely-heroes. 
 34. Id.  
 35. See MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM: IMPACT ON NORTH AMERICAN 
CORPORATE SECTORS 4 (2014), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/corp_gov/activist-interventions 
-roundtable-2014-materials/2014_03_shareholder-activism-impact-on-na-corporates.pdf [hereinafter 
MOODY’S REPORT]. 
 36. An Investor Calls, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/ 
briefing/21642175-sometimes-ill-mannered-speculative-and-wrong-activists-are-rampant-they-will-
change-american. 
 37. See, e.g., Brav et al., supra note 11, at 1741–45.  
 38. See id. at 1736–41, 1745–46 (drawing a distinction between non-confrontational and 
adversarial tactics); Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1029–42 (providing concrete illustrations). 
 39. See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1401–04 
(2007); Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical 
Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 684, 686 (2007). 
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often gaining, the support of institutional investors.
40
 They have also been 
increasingly successful in pursuing these changes. In 2013, hedge funds 
initiated the majority of proxy fights and won most of them.
41
 In 2014, 
they won 73 percent of their proxy battles,
42
 gaining board seats at 107 
companies,
43
 another all-time record. Economically, hedge funds have also 
been extremely successful, especially in the size of assets they manage, 
which has steadily increased in the recent past. In 2014, total assets 
managed by activist hedge funds surged to about $166 billion,
44
 an 
increase of about 150 percent from total assets of almost $65.5 billion in 
2012.
45
 
Everyone involved in the current corporate governance debate agrees 
that the rise of hedge funds has brought about a novel class of empowered 
shareholders, who actively use governance levers to pursue their 
investment objectives. The high-powered compensation structure of hedge 
fund managers
46
 and the concentration of funds’ investments in just a few 
targeted companies explain, among other factors, why the use of 
governance levers to achieve near- or intermediate-term investment 
objectives is rational for these investors. Disagreement, however, occurs 
when it comes to assessing the consequences of this change in the fact 
pattern, both as a theoretical and empirical matter. This Part provides the 
necessary background information on the current status of the theoretical 
and empirical debates about hedge fund activism. Part I.A discusses the 
different theories of hedge fund activism that have appeared in the 
literature, as well as their economic underpinnings. Part I.B briefly 
reviews existing empirical studies of activism, focusing on the 
implications of the various identification strategies that these studies have 
 
 
 40. See David Benoit & Kirsten Grind, Activist Investors’ Secret Ally: Big Mutual Funds, WALL 
ST. J.: MARKETS (Aug. 9, 2015, 10:38 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-investors-secret-
ally-big-mutual-funds-1439173910; Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of 
Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
863, 867 (2013) (describing institutional investors as having turned from “rationally apathetic” to 
“rationally reticent” after the appearance of hedge funds). 
 41. RICHARD LEE & JASON D. SCHLOETZER, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE ACTIVISM OF CARL 
ICAHN AND BILL ACKMAN 3 (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2442317. 
 42. DONNA DABNEY ET AL., THE CONFERENCE BOARD, IS SHORT-TERM BEHAVIOR 
JEOPARDIZING THE FUTURE PROSPERITY OF BUSINESS? 5 (2015), http://www.wlrk.com/docs/ 
IsShortTermBehaviorJeopardizingTheFutureProsperityOfBusiness_CEOStrategicImplications.pdf. 
 43. Benoit & Grind, supra note 40. 
 44. See LEE & SCHLOETZER, supra note 41, at 2. 
 45. MOODY’S REPORT, supra note 35, at 4.  
 46. These managers’ standard compensation structure provides a 2 percent fee over the assets 
they manage plus a performance fee of 20 percent. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1064–70 
(providing an exhaustive discussion of the several factors that collectively make activism a rational 
choice for hedge funds). 
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employed to mitigate endogeneity concerns—the ever-present risk in 
empirical research that correlation might be mistaken for causation.  
A. Theories of Hedge Fund Activism 
Theoretical disagreement over the implications of hedge fund activism 
is largely a reflection of a broader disagreement over what problems 
matter most in corporate governance. On this premise, as discussed below, 
three main theoretical accounts of hedge fund activism can be accounted 
for in the existing corporate law scholarship. We refer to these accounts as, 
respectively, the “managerial agency view,” the “traditionalist view,” and 
the “limited commitment view.” 
1. The Managerial Agency View  
Shareholder advocates ground the defense of hedge fund activism—
and more generally a governance model with empowered shareholders—
on two basic assumptions. The first, and fundamental, assumption draws 
on Jensen and Meckling’s classical agency paradigm of the firm.47 Under 
this paradigm, the agency problem arising between shareholders and 
managers is managerial moral hazard—the risk that managers may take 
hidden actions in their own interests and at the expense of shareholders.
48
 
In response to this problem, boards of directors should supervise managers 
in the interest of shareholders. For shareholder advocates, however, boards 
would be largely unhelpful in reducing managerial moral hazard. Boards 
would be impotent because entrenched managers could rely on their 
pervasive influence over the directors’ appointment process and the 
control over the flow of corporate information to capture directors, making 
them subservient to management or simply ineffective at fulfilling their 
monitoring function.
49
 The clearest evidence of board capture would be 
provided by the ability of executives to extract “pay-without-
performance”50: high-powered compensation schemes that would pay 
 
 
 47. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305–08 (1976).  
 48. See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES: THE 
PRINCIPAL AGENT MODEL 3 (2002).  
 49. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 754, 783–89 (2002).  
 50. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 8, 61–79, 80–82 (2004); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. 
Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 71, 82–88 (2003) 
(providing practical examples of pay-without-performance compensation arrangements).  
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executives more than “the minimum expected monetary payoff to be left 
[to agents] to preserve incentives”51 (i.e., what economists call information 
rents).
52
 
In response to these inefficiencies, shareholder advocates propose 
expanding the governance powers of shareholders.
53
 After all, if 
managerial moral hazard is the principal agency problem of corporate 
governance, who can be better placed than shareholders, as the 
corporation’s residual claimants, for constraining it?  
Viewed through this lens, hedge funds thus emerge as the natural 
champions of the shareholder franchise. Under the Berle and Means 
canonical account of U.S. corporate governance, collective action 
problems prevent dispersed shareholders from using governance rights as 
an effective response to managerial moral hazard.
54
 While the re-
concentration of equity ownership in the hands of institutional investors 
solved part of these collective action problems, the diversification of 
institutional investors’ interests still induced them to prefer exit (i.e., the 
sale of shares) over voice (i.e., the exercise of governance) as a remedy to 
managerial moral hazard.
55
 At best, these investors conceived of 
governance levers as “defensive”—designed to resist managerial 
initiatives—but never “offensive” or “proactive.”56 This is not true of 
activist hedge funds, which have turned the “offensive” use of governance 
levers and the pursuing of a proactive agenda into their distinctive 
features. It is thus unsurprising that shareholder advocates view activist 
hedge funds as an innovation that has finally turned shareholder 
governance rights into an effective means of value enhancement, with 
 
 
 51. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 117 (2006). Bebchuk and Fried refer to 
this excessive rent as “positional rent.” BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 50, at 62. 
 52. See LAFFONT & MARTIMORT, supra note 48, at 29.  
 53. Notably, the leading voice among shareholder advocates is Harvard Law School’s Lucian 
Bebchuk. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 50, at 198 (arguing that shareholders should play a 
greater role in setting executive compensation); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto 
in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973 (2002) (challenging board primacy in the takeover 
context); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 
851–75 (2005) (advocating for the expansion of shareholder governance rights); Lucian A. Bebchuk, 
The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 694–711 (2007) (advocating a reform of 
corporate elections so as to make directors more accountable to shareholders).  
 54. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 6, 84–89 (reprint ed. 1982).  
 55. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990).  
 56. See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder 
Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51 (2011). 
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activist campaigns also promoting and coordinating interventions by 
traditionally more passive institutional investors.
57
  
The second assumption on which shareholder advocates rely in 
defending the merits of hedge fund activism is the efficiency of market 
prices in providing an informational focal point for the exercise of 
shareholder governance. Under this assumption, the traditional argument 
that board authority over the corporation needs to be preserved because of 
the informational disparity existing between firm insiders and outsiders 
would lose much of its strength. Indeed, under the (semi-strong form) 
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) that market prices 
effectively aggregate all available public information,
58
 market prices 
would effectively bridge that informational disparity. Accordingly, activist 
hedge funds would act as specialists in monitoring and undertaking 
fundamental analysis and combine with institutional investors, acting as 
specialists in low-cost diversification, to offer efficient, market-based 
stewardship of business decisions.
59
 
2. The Traditionalist View  
In stark contrast with the view of hedge fund activism defended by 
shareholder advocates, traditionalists who support the board-centric model 
of the corporation argue that activist hedge funds are essentially motivated 
by achieving short-term gains, regardless of the effects this may produce 
on long-term firm value.
60
 Thus, whereas shareholder advocates view 
typical hedge funds’ demands for cutting operating expenses, increasing 
leverage or distributing dividends as beneficial to helping constrain empire 
building and other forms of private benefit seeking by entrenched 
managers,
61
 traditionalists attack these actions as a quick way to drive up a 
company’s share price, without taking into account long-term effects.62  
 
 
 57. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 40, at 867, 890, 893. 
 58. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 
J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970).  
 59. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 40, at 867. 
 60. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 4, at 1093–96 (providing an overview of the scholarly 
positions defending what they refer to as the “myopic-activists claim”). 
 61. See id. at 1135–41 (referring to these actions as beneficial “investment-limiting” 
interventions). 
 62. See, e.g., Bill George, Activists Seek Short-Term Gain, Not Long-Term Value, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Aug. 26, 2013, 10:56 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/activists-seek-short-
term-gain-not-long-term-value/ (arguing that activists’ “real goal is a short-term bump in the stock 
price. . . . Then they bail out, leaving corporate management to clean up the mess.”). 
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Underpinning this approach to hedge fund activism are radically 
different assumptions regarding the relationship between shareholders, 
directors, and managers. Board traditionalists defend the primacy of the 
board of directors as the institution that is vested by law with virtually 
exclusive authority over the corporate affairs and that is charged with the 
protection of shareholder interests against the risk of managerial moral 
hazard.
63
 To these scholars, the board’s informational advantage provides 
the key economic argument for this allocation of corporate powers,
64
 while 
they reject the shareholder advocates’ view that market prices provide an 
informational focal point that is sufficient to fill the informational 
asymmetry between boards and shareholders.  
Accordingly, traditionalists also argue that the board’s incentive to 
acquire private information—and to act on that information so as to 
maximize long-term firm value—risks being lost if less informed 
shareholders are granted the power to constantly disrupt board actions. 
They likewise reject the claim of board capture, maintaining that the 
intrinsic trustworthiness of experienced and well-accomplished directors 
makes this claim likely to be largely unsupported in practice,
65
 unlike the 
threat of short-termism, which would have real teeth in the current 
governance environment with increased hedge fund activism.
66
  
3. The Limited Commitment View 
The major criticism advanced by shareholder advocates against the 
traditionalist view of hedge funds is that even if activism raises short-
termism concerns, such concerns should not be placed on equal footing 
with the more fundamental issue of managerial moral hazard, which 
 
 
 63. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing 
Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (2014).  
 64. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 557–59 (2003) (suggesting that the board of directors incarnates 
economist Kenneth Arrow’s description of a “central agency to which all relevant information is 
transmitted and which is empowered to make decisions binding on the whole firm.”).  
 65. For arguments defending the view that directors in the aggregate can be trusted to do what is 
good for shareholders, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 315–19 (1999); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, 
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1800–
07 (2001); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary 
Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 798–813 (2002).  
 66. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Empiricism and Experience; 
Activism and Short-Termism; the Real World of Business, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
FIN. REG. (Oct. 28, 2013, 9:40 AM), https://perma.cc/7QXL-WREU. 
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remains the first-order governance problem.
67
 Under this assumption, the 
benefits of activism—and, more generally, shareholder empowerment—
exceed any cost from increased short-termism.  
As two of us have explained elsewhere, however, this account of 
shareholder empowerment fails to fully consider the market imperfections 
that affect corporate relationships.
68
 Drawing on the simplified outline 
provided by the Jensen and Meckling principal-agent model of the firm, 
shareholder advocates vindicate the optimality of shareholder 
empowerment. They do so assuming away heterogeneity in shareholders’ 
future consumption preferences as well as feedback from other markets, 
while also posing that all markets are complete and prices and value-
relevant information are general knowledge. In the real corporate world, 
however, shareholders’ consumption preferences are not uniform. 
Shareholders may have shorter- or longer-term liquidity needs as well as 
different risk preferences. Further, real market structures are distant from 
the idealized structure of complete markets, in which non-uniform 
shareholders’ consumption preferences do not represent a problem because 
everything is tradable in advance. Hence, shareholder disagreement over 
production choices may occur.  
The most tangible manifestation of this theoretical result is that such a 
disagreement is constantly observed between actual shareholders. If 
shareholders have optimal, un-conflicted incentives for corporate decision-
making, why do different shareholders with similar information disagree 
so often about the best corporate policy to pursue? Proponents of 
shareholder empowerment have so far failed to address this central 
question.  
What we refer to as the shareholders’ limited commitment problem 
challenges the additional assumption shareholder advocates make that 
market prices accurately reflect information on managerial performance. 
This assumption breaks down once one considers that, under the 
conditions of information asymmetry existing in the real corporate world, 
firm insiders such as directors and managers have private information that 
outside shareholders do not have and that cannot be easily shared with the 
latter. As a result, market prices may fail to be informative, meaning that 
prices may fail to capture the implications of directorial and managerial 
 
 
 67. See supra note 8.  
 68. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 9, at 109–12 (providing a general equilibrium explanation 
that strips away the assumption that shareholders necessarily have optimal incentives to offer value-
maximizing inputs). 
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private information until those implications begin to show up in cash 
flows over time.
69
  
Market prices are especially likely to be uninformative in the case of 
firm-specific investments—such as investments in innovation or other 
intangible assets—as information about the fundamental value of these 
investments tends to be “soft,” that is, non-verifiable by outsiders even if 
insiders share their views with the former.
70
 At the same time, though, 
channeling resources to such investments tends to require large capital 
expenditures up front and, hence, to decrease earnings in the short term. 
This decrease in present earnings is a type of “hard” information that the 
current stock price can more easily incorporate, so that decreased earnings 
will tend to lead to lower short-term stock prices.
71
 As a result, 
shareholders may take the fall in short-term stock prices following the 
undertaking of a profitable long-term project to signal managerial 
underperformance
72
 and, hence, rationally decide to remove the manager 
or seek other changes in existing firm policies, or otherwise dump their 
shares, increasing the likelihood of a change in control.  
The costs arising from these market imperfections are not limited to the 
expected loss of value caused by the mistaken removal of a “good” 
manager or the undertaking of inefficient changes in firm policies. More 
substantial costs arise from the likelihood that, ex ante, fear of shareholder 
retribution will induce managers to pass up profitable long-term projects 
that are more likely to be associated with lower short-term firm outcomes 
or overinvest in less profitable short-term projects.
73
 Similarly, important 
 
 
 69.  More technically, non-informative prices are “nonmonotonic” in the sense that they do not 
follow a consistent informational pattern due to the information asymmetry problems existing between 
shareholders and managers. See Sepe, supra note 9 (manuscript at 28 n.138). The economic 
mechanisms explaining such inconsistency hinges on Bayesian updating, which identifies the process 
through which rational investors update their beliefs about firm value. See Paul R. Milgrom, Good 
News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications, 12 BELL J. ECON. 380 (1981). 
Importantly, the possibility of price discontinuity does not require discarding even the semi-strong 
version of the ECMH hypothesis. Because the root cause of price discontinuity lies in the insiders’ 
private knowledge of business conditions, assuming that market contracting accurately reflects all 
available public information does not change the conclusion that the market may fail to perceive 
actions that are expected to be positive in the long-term as positive in the short-term. 
 70. See TIROLE, supra note 51, at 250. 
 71. See Alex Edmans et al., The Real Cost of Financial Efficiency When Some Information Is 
Soft2 (European Corporate Governance Inst. Fin., Working Paper No. 380/2013, May 3, 2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2316194. 
 72. See Sepe, supra note 9, at 28–32 (providing a numerical example). 
 73. While it might be tempting to downplay the importance of this kind of production as only 
affecting a restricted set of companies, this approach underestimates the vast transformation that 
corporate production has undergone in the last thirty to forty years. Under this transformation, 
investments in innovation and other long-term specific projects are no longer an exception, but 
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stakeholders might be discouraged from investing optimally in the firm if 
the value of their firm-specific investments might be reduced by the 
shareholders’ ability to seek a change in investment policy, agree to a 
hostile takeover, or rapidly sell their shares. 
This theoretical framework predicts that activist hedge funds can 
considerably exacerbate the limited commitment problem for two basic 
reasons. First, the risk of shareholder intervention—whether in the form of 
managerial removal, a change in current firm policies, or a change in 
control—significantly increases in a corporate environment featuring 
increased activism, as governance interventions are always individually 
profitable to hedge funds given their short-term investment interests. This 
is because market prices will still tend to react positively in the near term 
to the hard information of a disappointing firm outcome followed by the 
announcement of an activist campaign. Further, as confirmed by the 
anecdotal evidence, hedge fund activism will also tend to trigger 
intervention by other shareholders, such as institutional investors, as these 
investors may interpret the activist campaign as confirming the view that a 
low short-term firm outcome signals managerial underperformance. 
Second, hedge funds are more empowered than other shareholders to 
promote drastic short-term changes in a firm’s corporate governance or 
corporate policies as they can count on bargaining levers—such as the 
threat of an adversarial public campaign or a proxy fight—that de facto 
provide them with means to coerce board approval to desired changes, if 
not to replace incumbents. 
B. Empirical Studies 
Motivated by the theoretical debate’s contradictory claims, empirical 
studies on hedge fund activism have largely focused on investigating the 
financial wealth impact of activist hedge fund interventions. Underpinning 
this approach is one common assumption. If hedge fund activism is 
beneficial to constrain managerial moral hazard—as asserted by 
shareholder advocates—the empirical evidence should document that 
activism is value enhancing. Conversely, under the view that hedge fund 
activism exacerbates the shareholders’ limited commitment problem and 
the risk of short-termism, activism should be found to be value reducing.   
 
 
arguably a defining feature of many twenty-first-century corporations. See Cremers & Sepe, supra 
note 9, at 120–21.  
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1. Short-Term Event Studies 
Earlier empirical investigations of hedge fund activism have mainly 
taken the form of short-term event studies examining the stock price 
reactions to Schedule 13D filings, which investors are required to file with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) when they acquire more 
than a five percent stake in public companies.
74
 These studies have 
generally found that firms targeted by activist hedge funds tend to earn 
positive abnormal returns at the announcement of an activist campaign, 
although the observed economic magnitude of the abnormal returns 
varies.
75
  
Short-term event studies of activism, however, cannot address the 
criticism that the short-term abnormal returns accompanying activist 
interventions might come at the expense of long-term declines in firm 
performance. Do actions such as cutting operating costs or increasing 
payout levels limit managerial empire building and wasteful expenditures, 
thereby adding to a firm’s sustained profitability, as argued by shareholder 
advocates? Or are they just a reflection of the activists’ ability to 
temporarily drive up the stock price so as to obtain quick profits, as 
maintained by critics of activism? By design, short-term event studies 
cannot answer these questions. Hence, while these studies have 
consistently showed that activism delivers, on average, short-term gains, 
they fail to address the more fundamental issue of whether activist 
interventions produce long-term value gains.  
2. Long-Term Effects of Activism  
Recognizing the limitations affecting short-term studies of activism, 
other empirical studies have attempted to undertake longer-term 
examinations of a target’s stock performance after a hedge fund campaign. 
In particular, in 2015, Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang 
subjected what they refer to as the “myopic-activists claim” to a 
comprehensive empirical examination.
76
 Using a dataset of approximately 
 
 
 74. See Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2014). Please add the citation 240.13d-1(a). 
 75. For a review of some of these studies, see generally Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: 
A Review, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS FIN. 185 (2009). 
 76. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 4, at 1089. Brav et al. also investigated firm valuations up to a 
year following the start of activist campaigns, finding that positive returns at announcement are not 
reversed in the next twelve months. See Brav et al., supra note 11, at 1762–63. A year, however, might 
constitute too short a period of evaluation to provide conclusive evidence on the long-term effects of 
activism. See Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; 
Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Economy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 
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2,000 interventions during the period 1994–2007,
77
 they documented that a 
target’s performance generally continues to increase in the five-year 
period after the start of activist hedge fund campaigns
78
 and especially so 
when the activist campaign is “adversarial,” that is, employs hostile 
tactics.
79
  
These results, however, need to be interpreted with caution. Indeed, 
because Bebchuk et al. also found evidence that hedge funds tend to target 
relatively underperforming firms,
80
 one cannot exclude the possibility that 
a “selection issue” might affect their results. Empiricists talk of such 
issues (also referred to as a “specification error”) when changes in the 
dependent variable might be attributable to factors other than changes in 
the independent variable.
81
 By their very purpose, hedge funds are 
selective when choosing firms to target for activist interventions. 
Therefore, firms being targeted by these funds are not randomly selected 
but are substantially different from other firms. This heterogeneity of 
targeted firms could then be the source of the observed increase in firm 
value that accompanies activist hedge fund interventions, rather than this 
increase being due to the hedge fund intervention directly. In particular, 
the evidence that hedge funds tend to target firms that are underperforming 
relative to industry peers raises the possibility that a target’s subsequent 
increase in firm value might be attributable to actions that other corporate 
actors—including key employees, top executives, directors, long-term 
 
 
(Feb. 26, 2013, 9:22 AM), https://perma.cc/J4N2-H7ZS (arguing that a meaningful evaluation of the 
long-term impact of hedge fund interventions should consider firm performance at least up to twenty-
four months after the start of an intervention). 
 77. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 4, at 1098–1101.  
 78. See id. at 1106–11 (using Tobin’s Q to measure firm value); id. at 1123–34 (using stock 
returns to measure firm value). Tobin’s Q is, roughly, the ratio of the market value of assets to the 
book value of assets. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order 
Predictions About Dividends and Debt, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 8 (2002). The measure was introduced 
by James Tobin in A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory, 1 J. MONEY, CREDIT & 
BANKING 15 (1969). Tobin’s Q has become a commonly recognized proxy for market valuation. See, 
e.g., Philip G. Berger & Eli Ofek, Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value, 37 J. FIN. ECON. 39, 40, 47 
(1995); Larry H. P. Lang & René M. Stulz, Tobin’s q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm 
Performance, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1248, 1249–50 (1994); Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership 
and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 294 (1988). 
 79. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 4, at 1141–45. 
 80. See id. at 1105–06. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence documented in other 
recent studies. See, e.g., Hadiye Aslan & Praveen Kumar, The Product Market Effects of Hedge Fund 
Activism, 119 J. FIN. ECON. 226 (2016); Nickolay Gantchev et al., Governance under the Gun: 
Spillover Effects of Hedge Fund Activism (Aug. 6, 2016), (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2356544. 
 81. GREENE, supra note 15, at 56–58. 
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shareholders, and other stakeholders like large customers or suppliers—
might put in place to improve performance.  
3. Matching and Hedge Fund Activism 
The main difficulty of incorporating selection issues into empirical 
studies is that it is impossible to observe the counter-factual. In the context 
of hedge fund activism, this would mean considering, ceteris paribus, 
what the financial value of firms targeted by activist hedge funds would 
have been if they had not been targeted. Given this inherent limitation, 
comparing the financial performance of targeted firms to the performance 
of a set of “control” firms is the closest possible alternative to a real 
counterfactual in this context.  
“Control” firms are firms with essential characteristics (e.g., firm 
value, size, level of leverage, year of observation) that are similar to the 
characteristics exhibited by the set of “target” firms in the period prior to 
the start of the activist hedge fund campaign. Therefore, the main 
difference between control firms and target firms is that the former have 
not (yet) been targeted though presumably hedge funds could have 
targeted them for activist intervention. Accordingly, if the control firms 
“match” the target firms in essential characteristics but for the activist 
intervention itself,
82
 then a comparison of the relative performance of the 
control firms and the targets in the time period following the start of the 
activist hedge fund campaign should significantly mitigate the concern 
that the results on activism are driven by heterogeneity of the targets.  
The CGSW study, coauthored by two of us, along with Erasmo 
Giambona and Eric Wang, employs such a “matching” procedure to revisit 
the long-term effects of hedge fund activism, using the same (though 
extended through time) dataset of the BBJ study that the authors of the 
BBJ study generously shared with us.
83
 The CGSW study selects control 
firms based on characteristics that it documents are important for 
predicting which firms are targeted in activist hedge fund campaigns, 
 
 
 82. The main assumption required to ensure robustness of the matching between control firms 
and targets is that the differences between them be “insubstantial,” such that (i) if activist hedge funds 
would have targeted the control firms, their subsequent performance would have been similar to the 
target firms’ performance, and (ii) if activist hedge funds would not have targeted the target firms, 
their subsequent performance would have been similar to the control firms’ performance. Essentially, 
this methodology assumes both that activist hedge funds tend to target firms with specific 
characteristics that make these target firms good candidates to be targeted, and that among the set of 
firms with such characteristics there is a certain randomness about which particular firms out of that 
set are actually chosen as targets. 
 83. See Cremers et al., supra note 17. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss2/5
p 261 Cremers et al book pages2/3/2017  
 
 
 
 
 
2016] ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS AND THE CORPORATION 283 
 
 
 
 
employing several different methods to assign control firms to the targeted 
firms.
84
 In each of the study’s matched samples, the target and control 
firms are similar in key ways by construction: among other relevant 
characteristics, both have relatively poor performance and relatively low 
firm valuations in the five-year period before the start of the activist hedge 
fund campaign, and they also have similar firm size and profitability in the 
year before the initiation of the activist hedge fund campaign. 
Using these matched samples to reconsider the evidence in the BBJ 
study, the CGSW study documents that the long-term change in the value 
of the targeted firms, as measured by Tobin’s Q,85 in the years after the 
start of an activist hedge fund campaign is on average significantly lower 
than the change in the Tobin’s Q of the control firms.86 This means that 
the long-term value of the firms in the control group(s) that were not 
targeted by activist hedge funds increased more than the value of the firms 
subject to an activist hedge fund campaign. Specifically, as shown by 
Figure 1 below, target and control firms have similar value up to four 
years before the start of the activist campaign, then the firm value of the 
targets tends to be 5.5% lower on average than the firm value of the 
control firms in the three years following the start of the hedge fund’s 
campaign, and about 9.8% lower on average thereafter.  
 
 
 84. See id. at 14–17.  
 85. See supra note 78. Unlike Bebchuk et al., supra note 4, at 1101, the CGSW study only uses 
Tobin’s Q to compare firm value in target and control firms, as stock returns tend to be a very noisy 
measure of long-term firm value. This also explain why Tobin’s Q (or, simply, “Q”), as Bebchuk et al. 
recognize, tends to be preferred as the standard metric of firm value in financial studies. See id. 
 86. See Cremers et al., supra note 17, at 17–19. 
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FIGURE 1: CHANGE IN FIRM VALUE OVER TIME FOR TARGETED AND 
CONTROL FIRMS
87
 
 
 
This finding suggests that the main result in the BBJ study—that firm 
value tends to go up after activist hedge funds commence their 
campaign—is likely driven by a selection effect. Activist hedge funds tend 
to target firms that have been relatively poorly performing in the past. 
However, the increases in value of the control firms suggest that other 
governance mechanisms or actors have been on average more successful 
than the typical activist hedge fund in turning these relatively poorly 
performing firms around.  
Once firm heterogeneity and the selection effects of hedge fund 
activism are taken into account through matching, the valuation of the 
effects of activism thus emerges as being considerably more complicated. 
This is because activism is associated with reduced, rather than increased, 
firm value in the long term relative to non-targeted control firms with 
similar characteristics as the targeted firms. As a caveat, this does not 
 
 
 87. Changes in firm value are measured as changes in Q as a percentage of sample average. The 
dotted lines indicate the 90% confidence intervals, as estimated using 1.7 standard deviations from the 
coefficient value on either side, for the difference between the respective changes in Tobin’s Q across 
the target and control samples, which suggest that these differences are (i) very small in the period 
preceding the start of the activist hedge fund campaigns and (ii) not only economically meaningful, but 
also statistically significant in the period after the start of the activist hedge fund campaign.  
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imply that activist hedge funds generally did not deliver value to their 
investors. Rather, these results strongly suggest that activist hedge funds 
have been successful stock pickers in the sample covered by the CGSW 
study, as the firms they targeted had positive abnormal stock returns in the 
period after the start of the activist campaigns. The fact that the control 
firms that were not targeted had even larger abnormal stock returns does 
not change that conclusion, even if it hints at a conflict of interest between 
investors in activist hedge funds and long-term or passive buy-and-hold 
investors. 
The CGSW study shows that these basic results are robust to a wide 
variety of ways to match control firms to targeted firms as well as to 
different ways to compute performance,
88
 and further examines the 
possible channels of the reduction in long-term firm value associated with 
hedge fund activism. In particular, the results in the CGSW study are 
consistent with the view that activism exacerbates the limited commitment 
problem, as the relative underperformance of targeted firms (compared to 
the performance of the control firms) is particularly sizable for firms that 
rely more on specific investments (such as R&D investments, intangible 
assets, and patents)
89
 and firms in industries characterized by longer-term 
stakeholder relationships (such as firms with high contract specificity, 
high labor productivity, and intensive use of unsecured debt).
90
 
II. QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE 
In this Part, we draw on the CGSW dataset to revisit some well-known 
activist hedge fund campaigns by assessing the targets’ performance 
against the performance of their control firms in that dataset. Indeed, 
hedge fund activism tends to make headlines either when things go very 
well or very poorly. Media stories, however, typically focus on how the 
target’s value changed before versus after the start of the activist hedge 
fund campaign
91—an approach that is unable to disentangle the effect of 
activism from other factors. In other words, popular accounts of activist 
interventions are subject to selection. Hence, the evidence presented in this 
Part should help control for these possible selection effects, while also 
more concretely illustrating the changes that activist hedge fund 
interventions bring about in target firms relative to control firms. This 
 
 
 88. See Cremers et al., supra note 17, at 19–24. 
 89. See id. at 24–26. 
 90. See id. at 26–27. 
 91. See infra text accompanying notes 95–105; 114–19; 120–25. 
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evidence, therefore, should allow us to better understand how those 
changes relate to long-term firm value.  
In selecting targeted firms, we focus on two broad categories that have 
been used to classify hedge fund campaigns: “control activism” and 
“governance activism.” Control activism refers to activist interventions 
that primarily involve changes in control, whether actual or attempted.
92
 
Governance activism involves, instead, interventions aimed at influencing 
the target’s business strategy and corporate policies, ranging from the 
exercise of public pressure on an incumbent board, to the running of a 
proxy contest to gain board seats or replace the CEO, to litigation against 
the board.
93
 
A. Control Activism 
Hedge funds have long been active in transactions involving changes in 
control, although they have been more likely to seek the sale of a targeted 
firm—or, conversely, to oppose the proposed acquisition of a target—than 
to make a bid to acquire a corporation.
94
 A well-known example of control 
activism is the 2004 activist campaign launched by renowned corporate 
activist Carl Icahn against Mylan Laboratories, then the largest American 
manufacturer of generic drugs.
95
 Icahn began amassing Mylan’s stock in 
July 2004 after its price had fallen following the company’s announcement 
of an offer to acquire King Pharmaceuticals, a producer of branded drugs, 
for $4 billion in cash. Upon disclosure of his 6.8 percent interest in Mylan 
in September 2004, Icahn attacked the company’s board, denouncing the 
proposed acquisition as overpriced and “an egregious [strategic] 
mistake.”96 He also announced his intention to launch a proxy fight to elect 
different directors to block the deal.
97
 The board’s adoption of a poison pill 
with a 10 percent threshold did not deter Icahn.
98
 In November 2004, in 
the continuing effort to force Mylan’s board to drop the deal with King, he 
 
 
 92. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1034. 
 93. See id. at 1029. 
 94. See Bratton, supra note 39, at 1390. 
 95. See id. at 1377–79; Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1036, 1075–78.  
 96. Mylan Labs. Inc. (Schedule 13D) (Sept. 7, 2004) (filed by Carl C. Icahn et al.).  
 97. See Mylan Labs. Inc. (Schedule 13D) (Sept. 7, 2004) (filed by Carl. C. Icahn et al.). 
 98. See Julie Creswell, Icahn the Spoiler, FORTUNE MAG. (Mar. 21, 2005), http://archive.fortune. 
com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2005/03/21/8254845/index.htm. See also infra notes 161–62 
and accompanying text (discussing the effect of a poison pill on a prospective bid).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss2/5
p 261 Cremers et al book pages2/3/2017  
 
 
 
 
 
2016] ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS AND THE CORPORATION 287 
 
 
 
 
offered to buy Mylan for about $5.4 billion,
99
 while inviting offers by 
other potential bidders.
100
 The tactic worked. In January 2005, the board 
abandoned the announced acquisition, blaming a failure to agree on 
essential terms.
101
  
Icahn, however, did not drop his activist campaign until six months 
later, continuing to push for the sale of Mylan until the board announced a 
massive share repurchase program.
102
 He then made his exit and pocketed 
an estimated profit of over $40 million,
103
 while also taking credit for a 32 
percent stock price increase since the start of his involvement in the 
company thirteen months earlier.
104
 “There is no question that shareholder 
activism has worked well to enhance shareholder value at Mylan”105 was 
Icahn’s conclusive statement on the subject matter.  
The assessment of Mylan’s long-term performance against its control 
firm in the CGSW dataset, however, suggests that Icahn’s statement was 
less than accurate. As explained above, control firms are selected such that 
their essential characteristics are similar to the characteristics exhibited by 
the target before the start of an activist hedge fund campaign, including, 
among others, a firm’s Tobin’s Q, industry, and size. Based on these 
criteria, the firm that was selected as Mylan’s control in the CGSW study 
was Estée Lauder Companies Inc., one of the largest manufacturers of 
cosmetics and other beauty products worldwide. While one could object 
that pharmaceuticals and cosmetics represent two different sectors within 
the manufacturing industry, these sectors share sufficiently similar features 
to be comparable. Among others, these common features include labor-
intensive production methods, high levels of capital expenditures and 
research and development (R&D) investments, competitive product 
market structures, and heavy regulation. Accordingly, we proceed to 
compare the financial performance of Mylan and Estée Lauder in the years 
following the start of Icahn’s activist campaign in Mylan in 2004, 
 
 
 99. See Andrew Pollack, Icahn Offers $5.4 Billion for Mylan, Drug Maker, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
20, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/20/business/icahn-offers-54-billion-for-mylan-drug-maker. 
html?_r=0. 
 100. Mylan Labs. Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 3–4 (Nov. 22, 2004) (filed by Carl C. 
Icahn et al.). 
 101. Mylan Labs. Inc., Mylan Comments on King Transaction (Rule 425 Communication) (Jan. 
12, 2005). 
 102. Mylan Labs. Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 14, 2005); see also Bratton, supra note 
39, at (describing Icahn’s campaign against Mylan). 
 103. See Gregory Levine, Icahn Seen Selling Most of Mylan Stake, FORBES (July 18, 2005, 12:33 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/2005/07/18/icahn-mylan-divestment_cx_gl_0718autofacescan04.html. 
 104. Mylan Labs. Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (July 18, 2005) (filed by Carl C. Icahn et 
al.). 
 105. See id. 
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benchmarking the percentage changes in Q for each company against the 
value of their Q in 2004.  
As shown by Figure 2 below, Mylan and Estée Lauder exhibit similar 
financial performance until 2003. In 2004, however, when Icahn begins 
his activist campaign, Mylan’s Q (2.73) had fallen below the Q of Estée 
Lauder (3.52)—consistent with the empirical evidence documenting that 
activist hedge funds tend to select underperforming companies.
106
 In 2005, 
the trend is reversed: when Icahn exits from his investment in Mylan, 
Mylan’s Q registers an increase of 35.36%, while Estée Lauder’s Q 
experiences a decrease of -21%. However, three years after the 
intervention, in 2007, the situation looks almost the opposite: Mylan 
exhibits a huge cumulative decrease of -54.5%, while Estée Lauder 
registers a much lower cumulative decrease of -19%. After five years, in 
2009, the disparity between the two companies is even larger, with Mylan 
continuing to experience low valuations, while Estée Lauder begins to 
show clear signs of improved performance. 
FIGURE 2: TOBIN’S Q: MYLAN V. ESTÉE LAUDER 
 
  
A comparative approach to evaluate Icahn’s activist intervention in 
Mylan thus suggests that it was accompanied by detrimental, rather than 
beneficial, results for the company’s shareholders in the longer term. If so, 
one would then expect to find that Icahn’s campaign coincided with the 
 
 
 106. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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undertaking of corporate actions that contributed to increase Mylan’s Q in 
the short-term (e.g., up to a year after the intervention) at the expense of 
long-term firm performance. As discussed above,
107
 fairly standard items 
on the typical hedge fund’s agenda that fit such actions are the undertaking 
of higher leverage and the reduction of capital expenditures, which are 
both typical “liquidity events.”108 In order to test this hypothesis, we 
consider how the levels of Mylan’s leverage and Capex109 changed after 
Icahn’s intervention relative to Estée Lauder’s levels. As also noted above, 
shareholder advocates look at these actions differently, suggesting that 
increasing leverage and cutting capital expenditures limit management’s 
tendency to invest excessively.
110
 However, in light of the data on Mylan’s 
long-term performance, considerable changes in the company’s leverage 
and Capex levels around Icahn’s intervention would be difficult to 
reconcile with these advocates’ theory of beneficial “investment-limiting” 
interventions.  
As shown by Figure 3 below, the changes in Mylan’s leverage levels 
following the start of Icahn’s campaign are consistent with our conjecture. 
Between 2004 and 2005, Mylan increased its leverage by an astonishing 
358%, while Estée Lauder only increased its leverage by 4.6%. While part 
of the 2005 leverage increase was caused by the share repurchase program 
used to satiate Icahn,
111
 the data suggest that this reading of the effects 
produced by Icahn’s intervention on the company’s leverage might be 
reductive. Indeed, three years after Icahn’s intervention, Mylan registered 
an even higher cumulative increase in leverage of 509%, while Estée 
Lauder’s leverage only increased by 34.7%. This suggests that the activist 
intervention might have fundamentally redirected Mylan’s investment 
strategies toward shorter-term horizons, as higher leverage levels naturally 
constrain the managers’ ability to use cash flows to fund longer-term 
investments.   
 
 
 107. See supra text accompanying notes 60, 62. 
 108. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 29, at 572. 
 109. Capex is the ratio of the book value of capital expenditures over total assets. 
 110. See supra text accompanying note 61.  
 111. Mylan Labs. Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 14, 2005). 
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FIGURE 3: LEVERAGE: MYLAN V. ESTÉE LAUDER 
 
 
The data on Capex levels, as shown by Figure 4 below, are also 
consistent with this account of the effects of the activist intervention in 
Mylan. While in 2004 Mylan increased its Capex by 30.46% (relative to 
an increase of 6.10% in Estée Lauder’s), three years later the company cut 
its Capex by 77.1% (relative to an increase of 35.84% in Estée Lauder’s). 
Since Icahn became active in the company only toward the end of 2004, 
the increase in Capex during that year is likely attributable to strategic 
decisions made by the board before his intervention. Conversely, the 
decline in Capex that begins in 2005 seems consistent with Icahn’s 
intervention causing a radical transformation in Mylan’s business policy—
one that produced a drastic cut in long-term investments. 
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FIGURE 4: CAPEX: MYLAN V. ESTÉE LAUDER 
 
 
It could be argued, however, that Mylan is unrepresentative of cases in 
which activist hedge funds successfully seek a sale of the target, and that 
these other cases of activism may produce more beneficial effects
112—for 
example because activists are especially good at spotting firms that “make 
better candidates for sale than do others.”113 It is thus worth examining an 
example of control activism aimed at the sale of the target. An instructive 
example is the activist campaign launched by Third Point LLC (Third 
Point), another well-known activist hedge fund, against Pogo Producing 
(Pogo), an oil and natural gas company. Third Point targeted Pogo in 
2006,
114
 after the company had been underperforming competitors for 
about three years
115—again consistent with activists’ preferences for 
underperforming targets. Soon after filing its original Schedule 13D, Third 
Point requested that Pogo’s board “immediately initiate a process to sell 
 
 
 112. See Bratton, supra note 39, at 1380 (suggesting that Mylan is an outlier among target firms 
both for the unusually high payout granted to shareholders and the increase in leverage used to fund 
such payout).  
 113. See id. at 1390. 
 114. Pogo Producing Co. (Schedule 13D) (Nov. 21, 2006) (filed by Third Point LLC). 
 115. Catherine Shu, Investors Seek to Stick It to Pogo, BARRON’S (Jan. 3, 2007), 
http://www.barrons.com/articles/SB117011286770491702 (reporting that since the end of 2003, 
Pogo’s stock fell 1%, while the Standard & Poor's Midcap Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 
Index climbed 78%).  
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the Company in whole or several parts to the highest bidder or bidders.”116 
The fund also mounted a public campaign lamenting that Pogo’s 
executives had wasted corporate cash on empire-building acquisitions and 
threatened to begin a proxy contest to replace a majority of the board of 
directors at the 2007 annual meeting.
117
 A few months later, Pogo’s board 
announced that a “strategic alternatives process, which includes the 
possible sale or merger of Pogo . . . [was] ongoing.”118 Pogo was then sold 
to Plains Exploration & Production Co. in November 2007, at an 18 
percent premium over market price.
119
 
Thus, Pogo would seem a very successful hedge fund story. A 
matching approach, however, again reveals a less idyllic picture. Pogo’s 
control firm in the CGSW dataset (i.e., the firm within the same industry 
that had the closest Q to Pogo before the intervention by Third Point) is 
Forest Oil. Of course, we do not have Q observations for Pogo after 2007, 
but we have observations for Forest Oil. The conjecture here is that if 
Third Point’s pressure to sell Pogo accurately incorporated the view that it 
was time to remove underperforming managers from valuable assets, the 
acquisition premium paid to Pogo shareholders should capture the long-
term value of better managed assets and thus be comparable to Forest 
Oil’s longer-term Q observations. Yet, five years after Third Point’s 
intervention in Pogo, Forest Oil’s Q had increased by 35.85%, almost 
double the premium paid for the sale of Pogo, suggesting that in hindsight 
the intervention of Third Point in Pogo was less beneficial than one might 
think. Of course, it could be that the sale of Pogo had hidden synergies 
that were not reflected in the premium paid at acquisition, but those hidden 
synergies would have had to be considerable indeed.  
B. Governance Activism 
While control activism focuses on change-in-control transactions, 
governance activism focuses on changing a firm’s business strategy 
through the exercise of governance levers. The activist campaign run by 
 
 
 116. See Letter from Daniel S. Loeb, CEO, Third Point LLC, to Mr. Paul G. Van Wagenen, 
Chairman, President, and CEO, Pogo Producing Company (Dec. 1, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/230463/000089914006001686/t120106c.txt. 
 117. See id. 
 118. Press Release, Pogo Producing Co., Charges to Income Lead to Pogo’s First Quarter Net 
Loss (Apr. 24, 2007), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/charges-to-income-lead-to-pogos-
first-quarter-net-loss-58744162.html.  
 119. See The Associated Press, Plains, an Oil and Gas Producer, to Buy Pogo, N.Y. TIMES (July 
18, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/18/business/18pogo.html?smid=pl-share&_r=0. 
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Pershing Square Capital Management and Vornado Realty Trust against 
discount retailer J.C. Penney Company (“J.C. Penney”) provides a good 
example. In 2010, Pershing Square and Vornado disclosed their interest in 
the company,
120
 gained seats on the board of directors soon after,
121
 and 
then began a successful public campaign to replace J.C. Penney’s CEO at 
the time, Mike Ullman.
122
 The bet by Pershing Square and Vornado on 
J.C. Penney, however, was not a successful one. Sales plummeted under 
the new CEO, largely due to strategic mistakes in the company’s 
attempted makeover.
123
 Ullman was then called back until Pershing Square 
and Vornado tried to oust him again, but this time unsuccessfully.
124
 In 
2013, the investors decided to exit from J.C. Penney by selling their 
shares, taking a huge loss.
125
  
J.C. Penney is another difficult case to reconcile with the view that 
activist hedge funds add value by being especially versed in spotting 
entrenched managers and directors that fail to act in a manner that serves 
the best long-term interests of their company. This difficulty emerges even 
more clearly if one compares J.C. Penney’s performance after the start of 
the activist campaign by Pershing Square and Vornado to the performance 
of its control firm in the CGSW dataset, Dollar General (another discount 
retailer). In 2009, before Pershing Square’s intervention, the two 
corporations exhibited similar financial performance, with J.C. Penney 
having a Q of 1.08, and Dollar General having a Q of 1.52. At the end of 
the year of the intervention, 2010, the Q of JC Penney increased by 7.13%, 
while the Q of Dollar General only increased by 3.29%—consistent with 
standard short-term performance patterns following activist interventions. 
However, four years after the intervention, in 2012, the Q of J.C. Penney 
 
 
 120. J.C. Penney Co. (Schedule 13D) (Oct. 8, 2010) (filed by Pershing Square Capital 
Management, L.P. et al.).  
 121. Press Release, J.C. Penney Co., JCPenney Agrees to Name William Ackman and Steven 
Roth to Board of Directors (Jan. 24, 2011), http://ir.jcpenney.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=70528&p=irol-
newsCompanyArticle&ID=1518870. 
 122. Elizabeth Holmes & Joann S. Lublin, Penney Picks Boss from Apple, WALL ST. J. (June 15, 
2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303848104576385510781132614. 
 123. J.C. Penney Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 15, 2012). 
 124. Michael J. de la Merced, Ackman Resigns from Penney’s Board, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK 
(Aug. 13, 2013, 7:11 am), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/ackman-resigns-from-penneys-
board/. 
 125. Emily Glazer et al., Ackman Moves to Dump Entire Stake in J.C. Penney, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
26, 2013, 8:21 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732459120457903725113511 
4142; Matt Jarzemsky, Vornado to Exit Remaining Stake in J.C. Penny, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT 
(Sept. 19, 2013, 5:43 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/09/19/vorando-to-exit-remaing-stake 
-j-c-penney/. 
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had decreased by 17.94% as opposed to the Q of Dollar General, which 
had increased by 41.18%.  
The popular press blamed the company’s disarray on the hubris of Bill 
Ackman, the founder of Pershing Square, and Steven Roth, Vornado 
Chairman and CEO, suggesting that hedge funds should not meddle with 
“managing” companies, but rather should be content with acting as 
watchdogs that can keep executives with the right expertise on their 
toes.
126
 Yet, while hubris might explain why Pershing Square and Vornado 
stuck with J.C. Penney longer than usual for activists, this explanation 
does not help us understand what changes during the involvement of 
Pershing Square and Vornado played a role in the retailer’s failing 
performance. As in Mylan, a possible relevant change that emerges from 
the data is a substantial increase in leverage, as J.C. Penney on average 
increased its leverage by 19.49% during Pershing Square’s intervention, 
while Dollar General decreased its leverage by 25.68% over the same 
period of time. 
III. HEDGE FUNDS, RISK-TAKING, AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
The results of the CGSW study, and the anecdotal evidence illustrated 
in Part II, challenge the view that hedge fund activism generally offers a 
beneficial, market-driven corrective to managerial moral hazard. It is 
important to note, however, that managerial moral hazard and the 
shareholders’ limited commitment problem are not mutually exclusive. 
This means that these two problems could have different relevance for 
different firms, so that curbing managerial moral hazard and ensuring a 
longer-term firm commitment to value-creation could matter more to some 
firms than others. Under this hypothesis, if hedge fund activism was 
shown to reduce moral hazard, we could conclude not only that activism 
may have heterogeneous effects across firms, but perhaps also that 
activism may have net benefits for the performance of some subset of 
firms. On the other hand, if activism was not associated with significant 
moral hazard-related changes, one should conclude that to the extent that 
activism affects firm value directly, such effects seem to be dominated by 
the negative implications that arise from the exacerbation of the limited 
commitment problem. In this Part, and Part IV below, we expand the 
empirical investigation of the economic mechanisms through which hedge 
fund activism influences firm value with the aim of better understanding 
 
 
 126. See James Surowiecki, When Shareholder Activism Goes Too Far, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 
14, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/when-shareholder-activism-goes-too-far. 
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whether these mechanisms point to heterogeneity in the effects of 
activism.  
After describing our dataset and main variables, in this Part we focus 
on the relationship between activism and corporate risk-taking (as proxied 
by a firm’s bankruptcy risk) and executive compensation (as proxied by 
several measures capturing different dimensions of executive pay) by 
using matched samples to compare variations along these dimensions 
between a group of targets and their control firms over the period 1995–
2011. As we explain in more detail below, if the limited commitment view 
of activism is accurate, corporate risk-taking could be an important 
channel through which hedge funds might seek short-term gains at the 
expense of long-term value, as increased risk-taking transfers wealth from 
creditors to shareholders.
127
 Conversely, examining a target’s executive 
compensation should help shed light on the effect of activism on 
managerial incentives and, then, indirectly on the accuracy of the 
managerial agency view of activism.  
In Part IV, then, we consider the relationship between activism and the 
use of defensive measures. Indeed, the use of such measures, as well as 
hedge fund activism, are foundational components of the broader debate 
on the optimal allocation of power between boards and shareholders. 
Thus, examining how these measures and activism interact is of 
paramount importance to provide evidence to inform that broader debate.  
A. Data Description  
Our main data sample covers the period 1995–2011 and consists of all 
non-financial publicly traded firms in the Compustat database that are 
headquartered in the United States and that do not lack any data necessary 
to compute Tobin’s Q or any of our standard controls. These controls 
include firm size (LnSize), leverage (Leverage), the ratio of capital 
expenditures over the book value of total assets (Capex), the ratio of 
research and development expenditures over sales (R&D), the ratio of 
intangible assets over total assets (Intangibility), and return on assets 
(calculated as the ratio of the firm’s EBITDA over the book value of total 
assets, i.e., ROA). In addition, in all our logit regressions, we also control 
for a firm’s performance (Tobin’s Q). Note that the coefficients on 
standard controls, with the exception of Tobin’s Q, are not shown to save 
space.  
 
 
 127. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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Our data come from several sources. Data for hedge fund intervention 
come from the first comprehensive study of hedge fund activism published 
by Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy and Randall S. Thomas
128
 (as 
subsequently updated by some of the authors in later works).
129
 This study 
identifies hedge fund interventions through Schedule 13D filings,
130
 while 
also using information on the filer type required to be disclosed under Item 
2 of Schedule 13D to limit the sample to hedge funds, filtering out other 
firm types such as banks, brokerage companies, corporations, insurance 
companies, individuals, pension funds, and trusts.
131
 The study also relies 
on web-searches, newswires, and direct phone calls to help identify 
whether the filing entity is an activist hedge fund.
132
 Finally, it excludes 
filers who (i) only filed one 13D Schedule during the entire sample period, 
(ii) reported that the purpose of the acquisition was to get involved in 
bankruptcy reorganization or assume an arbitrage position in M&A 
activities, and (iii) do not explicitly report the reason for their 
acquisitions.
133
  
Data for our measure of risk, –Z-Score, comes from Compustat. Z-
Score incorporates information on a firm’s liquid assets, historical and 
current profitability, growth opportunities or market valuations of current 
assets, and asset turnover.
134
 By construction, a higher Z-Score indicates a 
firm with low bankruptcy risk, while a lower Z-Score indicates, 
conversely, a firm with more bankruptcy risk. For simplicity, we indicate 
our variable as –Z-Score so that results can be more intuitively interpreted 
 
 
 128. See Brav et al., supra note 11. 
 129. See Alon Brav et al., The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset 
Allocation, and Industry Concentration 5–7 (May 23, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.columbia.edu/~wj2006/HF_Real Effects.pdf (discussing data used). 
 130. See Brav et al., supra note 11, at 1736–37. 
 131. See id. at 1737. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. at 1738. 
 134. The Z-Score is a widely used proxy for the risk of bankruptcy and was proposed by Edward 
Altman. See Edward I. Altman, Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of 
Corporate Bankruptcy, 23 J. FIN. 589, 594 (1968). The Z-Score is calculated as follows: Z = 1.2 x T1 
+ 1.4 x T2 + 3.3 x T3 + 0.6 x T4 + 0.99 x T5. Here, T1 = Working Capital / Total Assets, a measure of 
the liquid assets in relation to the size of the company; T2 = Retained Earnings / Total Assets, a 
measure of profitability that reflects the company's historical earning power; T3 = Earnings Before 
Interest and Taxes / Total Assets, measuring current operating efficiency apart from tax and leveraging 
factors; T4 = Market Value of Equity / Book Value of Total Liabilities, proxy of the market’s 
perception of the efficient use of the firm’s assets; T5 = Sales / Total Assets, measure for total asset 
turnover. A Z-Score below 1.8 is generally interpreted as meaning that the company is likely headed 
for bankruptcy, while a Z-Score above 3.0 can be interpreted as suggesting that the firm is not likely to 
go bankrupt.  
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(i.e., a higher –Z-Score indicates more risk, while a lower –Z-Score 
indicates less risk). 
Data on executive compensation come from the ExecuComp database. 
In particular, we focus on four measures of executive compensation: Log 
CEO Total Compensation, CEO Pay Slice (CPS), CEO Delta, and CEO 
Vega. Log CEO Total Compensation is a proxy for the overall 
compensation payments received by CEOs, whether in the form of salary, 
bonuses, other annual compensation components, restricted stock grants, 
long-term incentive plans, option grants, or any other form of 
compensation. CPS is the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the 
firm’s top-five executive team captured by the CEO, introduced in a paper 
by one of us with Lucian Bebchuk and Urs Peyer.
135
 Information on a 
firm’s CPS is important because an excessive CPS might indicate a 
problem of board capture and therefore signal increased managerial moral 
hazard. CEO Delta measures the sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock 
price, capturing the alignment between shareholder and manager 
interests.
136
 Lastly, CEO Vega reflects the sensitivity of CEO 
compensation to stock return volatility, capturing the incentives in CEO 
compensation to increase risk-taking.
137
  
Data on historical incorporation information are retrieved from the 
dataset employed in a prior study on the association between firm value 
and (re)incorporation coauthored by two of us.
138
 This dataset combines 
data from two sources: the COMPHIST database with Compustat header 
history, whose effective dates start around 2007, and the CSTHIST 
database, whose effective dates start in 1994 and end around 2007. 
Incorporation information matters for our investigation of the relationship 
between corporate law rules and hedge fund activism because of the 
differences in the way states regulate takeovers. Starting in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, most American states began to enact various types of 
anti-takeover statutes, which provided added protection to incumbent 
 
 
 135. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The CEO Pay Slice, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 199 (2011). 
 136. CEO Delta is estimated as the percent change in the value of a firm’s CEO option portfolio in 
year t for a one percent increase in stock price. See John Core & Wayne Guay, Estimating the Value of 
Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their Sensitivities to Price and Volatility, 40 J. ACCOUNT. RES. 
613, 615 (2002).  
 137. CEO Vega is expressed as the percent change in the value of a firm’s CEO option portfolio 
for a one percent increase in the volatility of the returns on the underlying stock. See id.  
 138. See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, “The Financial Value of Corporate Law: 
Evidence from (Re)Incorporations” (Nov. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id=2519238.  
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directors faced with an unsolicited tender offer.
139
 Incorporation 
information is thus relevant to capture the differences between states’ 
antitakeover (or pro-takeover) stances and, more generally, the extent to 
which a state legislation can be considered as more managerial-friendly or 
shareholder-friendly.  
Finally, data on staggered boards (Staggered Board) and poison pills 
(Pill)—the two most common defenses firms can adopt to protect directors 
from the threat of removal—are obtained from the dataset employed in a 
prior study on the association between staggered boards and firm value 
coauthored by two of us along with Lubomir Litov.
140
 The source for this 
dataset is the corporate governance database maintained by Risk Metrics 
(formerly, the Investor Responsibility Center). Staggered Board and Pill 
are indicator variables that are equal to one if a firm’s board is staggered 
or has adopted a visible poison pill respectively; otherwise they are zero. 
B. Corporate Risk-Taking  
Under the view that activism would exacerbate the limited commitment 
problem, activists can push for governance and policy changes that are 
driven by a short-term investment horizon and may introduce distortions 
in the ex-ante incentives of both managers and other stakeholders to 
optimally invest in the firm. One form these short-term changes can take is 
excessive risk-taking. Indeed, as fixed claimants, creditors and other 
stakeholders are exposed to the risk of wealth-transferring actions that 
enrich shareholders at their expense, with excessive risk-taking providing 
the classic example.
141
 Economically, this problem arises out of the 
divergent upside and downside potential exhibited by creditors versus 
shareholders. As creditors possess a claim with limited upside and 
significant downside, they are largely indifferent to increases in returns 
from corporate assets, while they are highly sensitive to declines in asset 
value and thus prefer safer investment strategies. In contrast, as residual 
corporate claimants, shareholders are highly sensitive to increases in 
 
 
 139. See generally Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in 
Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1812–14 (2002) (citing GRANT A. GARTMAN, STATE 
ANTITAKEOVER LAW (2000)).  
 140. K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Staggered Boards and Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited, J. FIN. 
ECON. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 12–13), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2364165. 
 141. In addition to excessive risk-taking, other actions that may illegitimately transfer wealth from 
creditors to stockholders include the payment of excessively large dividends, the issuance of additional 
debt, and underinvestment. See Smith & Warner, supra note 24, at 118–19. 
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equity returns, while the protection of limited liability makes them 
comparatively less sensitive to losses. Once a corporation has outstanding 
debt, this payoff structure induces shareholders to prefer riskier over safer 
projects. Indeed, if things go well, shareholders expect to capture most of 
the upside potential of such projects. If things turn awry, instead, creditors 
will bear a significant part of the losses.
142
  
Given their business model, hedge funds are especially likely to 
advocate—often successfully so—for greater risk taking either through 
pursuing riskier corporate projects or by increasing financial leverage, as 
both of these strategies can be expected to result in positive short-term 
stock returns. This spike in short-term stock returns, however, comes at 
the expense of creditor interests. Hence, creditors can be expected to 
respond to the higher likelihood of excessive risk-taking they face in a 
market with intense activism by demanding higher interest rates ex-ante, 
with the end result being reduced long-term firm value.  
Empirically, if this interpretation of the relationship between hedge 
fund activism and excessive risk-taking is correct, we would expect to find 
that the bankruptcy risk exposure of hedge funds’ targets increases 
following the hedge fund’s intervention relative to the level of risk of 
firms that do not become hedge funds’ targets (i.e., firms in our control 
group). This prediction is strongly suggested by a study by April Klein and 
Emanuel Zur, who find substantially negative short-term abnormal bond 
returns around the start of activist hedge fund campaigns, especially when 
these campaigns are adversarial or when the hedge fund seeks board 
representation.
143
 They further find that these short-term bond returns are 
more negative for firms that subsequently reduce cash holdings and sell 
assets or increase total debt, suggesting that bondholders generally 
correctly anticipate an increase in risk.
144
 Finally, the Klein-Zur study 
documents a negative association between short-term equity returns and 
short-term bond returns, suggesting a transfer of wealth from bondholders 
to stockholders, in the days surrounding the announcement of the start of 
the activist hedge fund campaign.
145
 
 
 
 142. For recent discussions of the problem of excessive risk-taking, especially in the context of the 
2007–2008 financial crisis, see, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ 
Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 255–57 (2010); Simone M. Sepe, Regulating Risk and Governance in Banks: A 
Contractarian Perspective, 62 EMORY L.J. 327, 338–42 (2012). 
 143. April Klein & Emanuel Zur, The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on the Target Firm’s 
Existing Bondholders, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1735, 1735 (2011). 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. at 1737. 
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Building upon the short-term results in the Klein-Zur study, we focus 
on the long-term repercussions, again using a matched sample to 
incorporate selection effects. Specifically, in Appendix Table A we run 
multivariate –Z-Score regressions (i.e., where –Z-Score is the dependent 
variable) in a matched sample,
146
 identifying hedge funds’ targets and their 
controls using the same matching criteria employed in the CGSW study.
147
 
Column (1) includes year and firm fixed effects, while Column (2) uses 
firm fixed effects rather than industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at firm level to account for the tendency of governance 
provisions to be stable across time.
148
 
As shown by Figure 5 below, which reproduces the results of Column 
(1) of Appendix Table A, the empirical evidence supports our theoretical 
hypothesis. In our matched sample, target firms and control firms have 
similar bankruptcy risks up to four years before the start of the activist 
campaign, where the minor difference is statistically insignificant. 
However, the bankruptcy risk level of the target firms is significantly 
higher than that of the control firms in the first three years after the hedge 
fund’s intervention (i.e., from t to t+3) and continues to be so thereafter 
(i.e., from t+3 to t+5). Our results are both statistically and economically 
significant. Specifically, the average bankruptcy risk measure is 10% 
higher for the targeted firms than for the controls in the first three years 
and is 11% higher thereafter.
149
   
 
 
 146. Our –Z-Score regressions do not control for ROA as this control is essentially included in the 
Z-Score calculation.  
 147. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 148. See Mitchell A. Petersen, Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: 
Comparing Approaches, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 435, 443 (2009).  
 149. We calculate these economic magnitudes by dividing the coefficients (0.389 for the period 
from t to t+3 and 0.419 for the period after t+3) by the average value of –Z-Score in the sample, which 
is 3.76. 
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FIGURE 5: BANKRUPTCY RISK OVER TIME FOR TARGETED AND CONTROL 
FIRMS
150
 
 
C. Executive Compensation  
Our results on the long-term increase of corporate risk-taking in firms 
targeted by hedge funds (relative to control firms) add to the CGSW 
results about the detrimental long-term financial value association of 
activist interventions and lend further support to the related limited 
commitment view of activism. However, under the conjecture that 
activism may have heterogeneous effects, it could be that activism also 
helps to reduce managerial moral hazard and that this may matter more to 
some firms than others. To further explore this hypothesis, we focus here 
on the relationship between executive compensation and activist 
interventions.  
 
 
 150. Changes in firm value are measured as changes in –Z-Score as a percentage of sample 
average. The dotted lines indicate the 90% confidence intervals, as estimated using 1.7 standard 
deviations from the coefficient value on either side, for the difference between the respective changes 
in –Z-Score across the target and control samples, which suggest that these differences are (i) very 
small in the period preceding the start of the activist hedge fund campaigns and (ii) not only 
economically meaningful, but also statistically significant in the period after the start of the activist 
hedge fund campaign.  
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As discussed earlier, excessive executive pay (also referred to as “pay 
without performance”) is described by shareholder advocates as providing 
the clearest evidence of the problems of board capture and managerial 
moral hazard.
151
 Further, public criticism of the excessively generous 
compensation packages of cash, stock grants, options, and other benefits 
allegedly provided to executives of targeted firms has become a fixture 
tactic of activist campaigns. For example, Dan Loeb, founder and head of 
the activist hedge fund Third Point, has built a reputation for his withering 
criticism of excessive executive compensation and other executive waste 
at targeted companies. In the “colorful” letters he regularly writes to 
accompany Third Point’s disclosure of interest in targeted companies, 
Loeb has attacked target executives for, among other things, awarding 
themselves unjustified compensation in the millions of dollars,
152
 using the 
firms as their “personal ‘honey pot,’”153 the general “lack of expense 
discipline,”154 and even for feasting “on organic delicacies and imbib[ing] 
vintage wines at a cost to shareholders of multiple hundreds of thousands 
of dollars.”155 
If it truly is the case that hedge fund activist campaigns offer a 
corrective to managerial moral hazard, then one would expect to observe 
significant changes in the targets’ executive compensation (relative to non-
targeted firms) following such interventions. Empirically, we test this 
hypothesis by investigating the association between hedge fund 
interventions and four different variables of executive compensation—Log 
CEO Total Compensation, CEO Pay Slice, CEO Delta, and CEO Vega (all 
described in Part III.A above)—in a matched sample. In identifying hedge 
funds’ targets and their controls, we again use the same matching criteria 
employed in the CGSW study,
156
 but with a (smaller) sample where 
information on executive compensation is available. Likewise, we also 
always include year and firm fixed effects and report robust standard 
errors clustered at firm level.  
 
 
 151. See supra text accompanying notes 49–52. 
 152. Letter from Daniel S. Loeb, CEO, Third Point LLC, to Mr. William F. Ruprecht, Chairman, 
President and CEO, Sotheby’s (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/823094/ 
000119312513388165/d605390dex993.htm [hereinafter Loeb’s Letter to Ruprecht]. 
 153. Letter from Daniel S. Loeb, CEO, Third Point LLC, to Mr. Irik P. Sevin, Chairman, President 
and CEO, Star Gas Partners L.P. (Feb. 14, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1002590/ 
000089914005000128/t2774169.txt. 
 154. See Loeb’s Letter to Ruprecht, supra note 152.  
 155. See id. 
 156. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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As shown in Appendix Table B, in contrast to the managerial agency 
view that activism provides a beneficial corrective to instances of 
managerial moral hazard, we find no significant changes in the executive 
compensation of targets as compared to the compensation of control firms 
from one year to three years after the start of an hedge fund campaign.  
In particular, the lack of changes in Log CEO Total Compensation 
suggests that the level of information rents extracted by the CEO is left 
unaltered by activist hedge fund campaigns. This, in turn, may imply two 
things: either the CEO did not extract excessive rents before the 
intervention or, if she did so, she continued to extract the same inefficient 
level of rents after the intervention. Importantly, both possibilities are 
incompatible with the hypothesis that the ability of hedge funds to better 
discipline management explains the private gains they realize through 
activist interventions.  
Similarly, the lack of changes in CPS suggests that either the fraction 
of the aggregate compensation captured by the CEO before the 
intervention was not excessive or, if it was, it continued to be so after the 
intervention. Again, both these interpretations challenge the managerial 
agency view of activism.  
The lack of changes in CEO Delta is possibly even more telling, as this 
variable captures the level of alignment between shareholder and manager 
interests, i.e., the degree of pay for performance. Hence, the fact that CEO 
Delta is unaffected by hedge fund interventions seems to suggest that 
shareholder and manager interests were either sufficiently aligned before 
such interventions or that any misalignment continued afterwards.  
Further, the lack of significant results on CEO Vega provides an 
important intuition on the source of the increase in bankruptcy risk that we 
document takes place in firms targeted by hedge funds in the years 
following the start of an activist hedge fund campaign. As CEO Vega 
captures the incentives in the CEO’s compensation contract to increase 
risk, our results suggest that the increase in the targets’ risk exposure are 
unlikely to be related to distortions arising in the risk incentives of the 
targets’ CEOs prior to the activist campaign. Overall, these results thus 
seem to reject the view that hedge fund interventions are effective at 
disciplining entrenched managers and, therefore, challenge the managerial 
agency theory of activism.  
IV. HEDGE FUNDS AND SHAREHOLDER COMMITMENT 
Our analysis of the relationship between hedge fund activism, on the 
one hand, and corporate risk-taking and executive compensation at 
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targeted firms, on the other, delivers results that strengthen the view that 
activist interventions exacerbate the shareholder limited commitment 
problem and, conversely, provide no support for the managerial agency 
view of activism. In this Part, we continue to explore these competing 
views of hedge fund activism. We do so by focusing on the relationship 
between activism, governance arrangements, and legal rules that both limit 
the shareholders’ ability to remove incumbent directors (and, more 
generally, intervene in the corporate affairs) in the near term, and make it 
more difficult for a prospective acquirer to proceed with a hostile 
acquisition.  
A. Defensive Measures and Hedge Fund Activism 
To shareholder advocates, private arrangements and rules designed to 
protect incumbents from shareholder interference—which they denote by 
the pejorative term of “insulation measures”157—serve to entrench 
managers, promoting increased managerial moral hazard.
158
 Staggered 
boards and poison pills provide classic examples of such measures.
159
 
Under a staggered board, directors are grouped into different classes 
(usually three) each serving a longer term (usually three years), so that 
each class of directors stands for reelection in successive years, rather than 
annually as under the default unitary board structure.
160
 In combination 
with a poison pill, the adoption of a staggered board is conventionally 
described as providing incumbents with de facto veto power over hostile 
bids.
161
 This is because a poison pill so dilutes a bidder’s economic rights 
that the only way to complete a takeover is to remove the pill first by 
appointing new directors.
162
 But if a company also has a staggered board 
in place, a prospective bidder will need to endure the costly delay of 
waiting through two-election cycles before being able to replace a majority 
 
 
 157. As observed by the Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr., the term 
“insulation advocates,” which shareholder advocates use to describe the positions of the defendants of 
board primacy, has an inherently negative connotation and “create[s] an intellectual straw man . . . to 
burn down easily.” Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction 
to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 450–51 (2014).  
 158. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 
783, 785 (2009) (documenting evidence that staggered boards and other defensive measures are 
associated with negative firm value).  
 159. See id. at 790–94.  
 160. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 9, at 76–77 (discussing the law of staggered boards). 
 161. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 893, 907 (2002); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma 
Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 412 (2005). 
 162. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 161, at 904–05 (setting forth terms of a standard poison pill).  
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of the board—a circumstance that substantially reduces a hostile bidder’s 
ability to gain control of the target.  
The anti-takeover statutes adopted by what we refer to as managerial-
states also serve to provide added protection to incumbent directors faced 
with unsolicited tender offers, and are therefore similarly opposed by 
shareholder advocates defending the need for unencumbered shareholder 
activism in corporate governance.  
The assessment of defensive measures, however, radically changes 
once one incorporates the shareholders’ limited commitment problem into 
the analysis. Under this broader analytical framework, these measures—
especially if premised on shareholder consent
163—emerge as helpful to 
commit shareholders to the evaluation of directorial and managerial 
actions in the longer term,
164
 when it is more likely that market prices will 
accurately reflect the fundamental value of those actions.
165
 They do so by 
making it more difficult for shareholders to remove incumbents in the near 
term—whether through a proxy contest or a takeover—and 
correspondingly weakening the shareholders’ ability to use the threat of 
early removal to interfere with business decisions. So viewed, defensive 
mechanisms would provide a commitment device to prevent shareholders 
from exercising their disciplining power at a time when this power might 
harm, rather than benefit, them.  
Weighing in on the debate on defensive measures, the BBJ study uses 
its results on the long-term effects of activism to argue that those results 
support the shareholder advocates’ claim that such measures are 
undesirable.
166
 In making this argument, the study seems to willingly 
ignore a series of more recent works
167—including a comprehensive study 
coauthored by two of us
168—which challenge the view that staggered 
boards are detrimental to shareholder interests. According to Bebchuk et 
 
 
 163. See K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Commitment and Entrenchment in Corporate Governance, 
110 NW. L. REV. 727 (2016) (documenting that defensive measures premised on shareholder consent 
are associated with increased firm value). 
 164. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 9, at 123–26 (discussing the commitment value of the 
staggered board); see also Lynn A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth? 
The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 STAN. L. REV. 845, 853–56 (2002) (criticizing past 
empirical studies for failing to consider the ex ante benefits of defensive measures). 
 165. See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate 
Objective Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 17 (2001).  
 166. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 4, at 1150, 1155. 
 167. For a summary of these studies, see Daniel M. Gallagher & Joseph A. Grundfest, Did 
Harvard Violate Federal Securities Law?: The Campaign Against Classified Boards of Directors 33–
41 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 199, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2536586. 
 168. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 9.  
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al., what matters is only that in their investigation activist interventions are 
on average associated with beneficial outcomes in the long term. 
Therefore, since “having a staggered board provides a significant 
impediment to hedge fund activism,”169 the adoption of a staggered board 
should be deemed detrimental to shareholder interests.  
When examined in light of the CGSW study, however, this account of 
staggered boards (and, by analogy, other defensive measures) presents 
several difficulties. First, by challenging the view that hedge fund activism 
produces beneficial long-term results, the CGSW study also challenges the 
claim made by Bebchuk et al. that the empirical evidence on activism 
weighs in favor of unitary board structures.
170
 Further, while the CGSW 
results can be fully reconciled with recent empirical findings documenting 
a positive association of staggered boards and long-term firm value, the 
BBJ study remains unable to explain such findings.  
But the CGSW study also challenges the conclusions drawn by the BBJ 
study about the adoption of defensive measures in a more subtle way. The 
claim that the adoption of significant limits to shareholders rights would 
raise substantial impediments to hedge fund activism seems fully 
consistent with the view that activism exacerbates the limited commitment 
problem. If the ability of forcing changes in corporate policies to rapidly 
drive up share prices explains hedge funds’ gains—as both the results of 
the CGSW study and the additional evidence presented in this Article 
suggest—the existence of devices that strengthen a board’s ability to resist 
drastic short-term corporate changes would naturally make a firm less 
appealing to hedge funds.  
On the contrary, this claim seems more difficult to reconcile with the 
managerial agency view of activism defended by Bebchuk and other 
shareholder advocates. Under this view, the value created by hedge fund 
activism essentially arises from the disciplinary function served by hedge 
funds vis-à-vis opportunistic managers. One would thus expect to find 
more, rather than less, hedge fund activism in firms that have adopted 
defensive measures. After all, if it is true that hedge fund activists have 
particular expertise and power to discipline entrenched managers, as 
shareholder advocates claim—and if such measures entrench management 
and encourage moral hazard, as shareholder advocates claim as well—then 
activists should realize substantial efficiency gains by targeting firms with 
more defensive measures. 
 
 
 169. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 4, at 1149. 
 170. See id. at 1150. 
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In response, however, a shareholder advocate could argue that when a 
firm can resort to defensive measures, the costs of an activist campaign are 
likely to outweigh any potential gains accruing to hedge funds. This 
argument, however, is unsatisfactory both in theory and in practice. First, 
even if the cost of activism increases when a firm has adopted defensive 
measures, so do the gains that hedge funds may expect to realize. Second, 
the changes occurring in corporate practices in the past decade suggest that 
the costs of removing defensive measures have substantially decreased, at 
least when these measures are adopted at firm level.  
Consider, for example, the staggered board. Contrary to the 
conventional view that effective staggered boards are a “powerful defense 
against removal” of incumbents,171 the empirical evidence documents that 
U.S. firms have increasingly shifted their boards from staggered to unitary 
since the 2000s.
172
 As suggested by several commentators, increased 
destaggering would be one of the most telling manifestations of the power 
gained by shareholders in corporate governance in the recent past,
173
 as a 
result of both changes in the marketplace (including the rise of activist 
hedge funds) and in the legal landscape governing it.
174
 In particular, the 
combination of voting recommendations in favor of destaggering 
proposals by proxy advisors
175
 and newly available shareholder 
governance levers (such as majority voting and vote-withholding 
campaigns)
176
 would have significantly enhanced the ability of 
shareholders to pursue successful destaggering campaigns.
177
  
 
 
 171. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 158, at 791.  
 172. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 9, at 99–100. 
 173. For a thorough discussion of these changes, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 3. 
 174. See Re-Jin Guo et al., Undoing the Powerful Anti-Takeover Force of Staggered Boards, 14 J. 
CORP. FIN. 274, 275 (2008); Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1360 (2013).  
 175. The recommendation that companies should have a unitary board, or that shareholders should 
seek a destaggering proposal, figures among the most important voting guidelines that proxy advisors 
routinely provide to investors. See, e.g., INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, INC., 2014 U.S. 
PROXY VOTING SUMMARY GUIDELINES 10 (2013), http://www.issgovernance.com/file/files/2014 
ISSUSSummaryGuidelines.pdf.  
 176. Under plurality voting, the directors who receive most of the votes cast are elected to the 
board, so that every nominee only needs one vote to be elected. Hence, engaging in a withhold (or 
“just say no”) campaign could express shareholders’ dissent with director nominees, but doing so only 
rarely led to material changes under this voting procedure. With the rise of majority voting, however, 
things have radically changed, as only nominees who receive a majority of the votes cast are now 
elected to the board. Vote withholding has thus acquired direct legal significance today, as 
shareholders can effectively use this process to throw incumbents out of office without having to file a 
proxy statement with the SEC. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 1010–11.  
 177. The Harvard Shareholder Rights Project (SRP), a clinical program established at Harvard 
Law School to assist institutional investors in the submission of precatory proposals to destagger the 
board, has contributed to board destaggering at around one hundred S&P 500 and Fortune companies 
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For all these reasons, while Bebchuk et al. do not support their 
conclusions about the relationship between activism and defensive 
measures with empirical evidence, such empirical examination seems 
warranted. We provide such an examination by using logit models to 
assess the likelihood that a firm might become a hedge fund’s target 
conditional on (i) different anti-takeover statutes, (ii) incorporation in 
Delaware relative to incorporation in states with more anti-takeover 
statutes, and (iii) the adoption of a staggered board or a poison pill.  
B. State Anti-Takeover Statutes 
We begin our analysis of the relationship between hedge fund activism 
and a firm’s defensive measures by investigating the likelihood that a firm 
might become the target of an activist hedge fund intervention in the next 
year conditional on different state-level anti-takeover statutes. In our 
sample as a whole, the unconditional probability that a firm might become 
a hedge fund target next year is 2.47%.  
In our analysis, we focus on the five most common types of anti-
takeover statutes, defining the following variables: Control-Share-
Acquisition, Fair Price, Poison-Pill-Endorsement, Constituency, and 
Business Combination.
178
 In addition to examining how hedge fund 
activism relates to the adoption of each of these statutes, we also employ 
an anti-takeover index that estimates the likelihood of a future activist 
intervention based on the number of such statutes a state has. As observed 
 
 
in just three years. See SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT, http://srp.law.harvard.edu (last visited Jan. 1, 
2016). 
 178. These variables are defined as follows: (i) Control Share Acquisition is defined as a dummy 
variable equal to one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has adopted a statute requiring the bidder 
to win approval of a majority of disinterested shares (typically between 20% and 50%) in order to be 
able to exercise the voting rights of its control stake (and is equal to zero otherwise); (ii) Fair-Price is 
a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has adopted a statute requiring a 
bidder who has succeeded in gaining a control block to pay a “fair” price (e.g., the same price paid to 
acquire the control block) to the remaining shareholders, so as to prevent two-tier acquisitions with a 
low back-end (and is equal to zero otherwise); (iii) Poison-Pill-Endorsement, a dummy variable equal 
to one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has adopted a statute authorizing the use of poison pills 
(and is equal to zero otherwise); (iv) Constituency, a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is 
incorporated in a state that has adopted a statute authorizing the use of defensive tactics in order to 
defend the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, such as employees or creditors (and is equal to 
zero otherwise); and (v) Business Combination is a discrete variable equal to: (a) one, if a firm is 
incorporated in a state that has adopted a statute preventing a bidder from engaging in a range of 
transactions with an acquired company (such as mergers, liquidations, and sales of assets) for up to 
three years after the bidder has acquired a controlling stake, (b) two, if a firm is incorporated in a state 
in which the delay imposed by the business combination statute for engaging in interested transactions 
extends to a period of up to five years, or (c) zero, if the firm is incorporated in a state that has not 
adopted a business combination statute.  
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by Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen, “antitakeover statutes are possibly 
important not only in what they actually do but also in what they signal. 
. . . Therefore, the number of statutes adopted by a given state might be 
important [as they signal a stronger state anti-takeover stance].”179 On this 
assumption, Bebchuk and Cohen introduced an anti-takeover index that 
assigned to each state a score from zero to five based on the number of 
anti-takeover statutes adopted by the state.
180
 We similarly employ a 6-
level State ATP Index, which closely mirrors the anti-takeover index of 
Bebchuk and Cohen, except that it assigns separate scores for three-year 
and five-year business combination statutes, which prohibit the raider 
from engaging in a freeze-out merger and other transactions with the 
target.
181
 The motivation for introducing this slightly different anti-
takeover index is to attempt to better capture the differences between 
“stronger” and “weaker” business combination statutes. Indeed, the 
differences between five-year and three-year business combination statutes 
are not just of a “quantitative” nature, but also “qualitative,” since the 
former tends to bar a larger number of transactions than the latter.
182
  
Table 1 below shows our results. Columns 1 to 5 assess how the 
probability that a firm might become a hedge fund’s target next year is 
related to each anti-takeover statute. Column 6 then shows results for the 
6-level State ATP Index.  
 
 
 179. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & 
ECON. 383, 409 (2003). 
 180. Id. 
 181. The 6-level State ATP Index thus attaches a score from zero to six to each state, with any 
state that has a five-year business combination statute being coded as also having a three-year business 
combination statute. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 138, at 11–13 (introducing the 6-level State ATP 
Index). 
 182. For example, New York’s five-year business combination statute bars any substantial sale of 
assets or merger after the threshold is crossed without prior approval. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. L. § 912 
(Consol. 2016). Conversely, the Delaware’s three-year statute defines the term ‘‘business 
combination’’ narrowly so as to cover only transactions between the target and the bidder or its 
affiliates. See 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2016). Further, Delaware’s three-year Business 
Combination statute is a default provision, which makes it easier for firms to opt out of this provision. 
See id. 
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TABLE 1: PROBABILITY OF BECOMING A HEDGE FUND TARGET AND 
STATE ANTITAKEOVER STATUTES 
This table presents the marginal effects estimates from logit regressions of 
the ex-ante probability of becoming a hedge fund target next year on 
different state antitakeover statutes and firm-level controls as of the end of 
this year. The hedge fund data is from the updated dataset used in Brav et 
al. (2008) and covers the period 1995 to 2011. The dependent variable is 
an indicator equal to one if the firm is targeted by a hedge fund in a given 
year, and zero otherwise. To construct our sample, we use all firms that 
have not been targeted by a hedge fund in the past five years. After a firm 
is targeted by a hedge fund, we drop it from our sample. We allow the firm 
to re-enter the sample if it has not been targeted by a hedge fund for at 
least five years. In the table, t-statistics appear between parentheses and are 
based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. Below the t-statistics of 
the state antitakeover statutes, as well as the 6-level State ATP Index, the 
percentage indicates the economic significance of the marginal change in 
the ex-ante probability of becoming a hedge fund target next year relative 
to the unconditional probability in the sample, which is 2.47%. This 
percentage is calculated as the marginal change from 0 to 1 for indicator 
variables and from 0 to 6 for the 6-level State ATP Index. We control for 
the firm’s Tobin’s Q as well as the standard controls LnSize, Leverage, 
CAPEX, R&D, Intangibility and ROA. Coefficients on standard controls 
are not shown in order to save space. Statistical significance of the 
coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels by 
***, **, and * respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Uncond. Prob. of 
becoming target 
next year:   2.47%   
Control-Share-
Acquisition 
-0.407%***     
 
(2.76)      
 
-20%      
Fair-Price 
 -0.474%***    
 
 (3.37)     
 
 -23%     
Poison-Pill-
Endorsement 
  -0.358%***   
 
  (2.55)    
 
  -17%    
Constituency 
   -0.426%***  
 
   (3.01)   
 
   -21%   
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Business 
Combination 
    -0.075%*** 
(3Y: 1; 4/5Y: 2) 
    (0.70)  
 
    -4%  
6-level State ATP 
Index 
     -0.10%*** 
 
     (2.99) 
 
     -29% 
Tobin's Q 
-0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0047 
 
(7.45) (7.47) (7.46) (7.48) (7.43) (7.48) 
Standard Controls 
Included 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 
52,416 52,416 52,416 52,416 52,416 52,416 
Pseudo R2 
0.0104 0.0108 0.0103 0.0106 0.0098 0.0105 
 
As shown by Table 1, all the antitakeover statutes negatively predict a 
future hedge fund intervention with meaningful economic magnitudes and 
strong statistical significance. Similarly, our anti-takeover index also 
negatively predicts a future hedge fund intervention, so that the higher the 
number of statutes, the less likely it is that a firm will become a hedge 
fund’s target next year. In particular, the coefficient estimates suggest that 
reincorporation from a state with a zero State ATP Index score to a state 
with State ATP Index of 6 is associated with a 29%
183
 lower probability of 
becoming a hedge fund’s target next year relative to the 2.47% 
unconditional probability in our sample. 
When read against the results obtained by the CGSW study the 
additional evidence provided by this Article on the increase of bankruptcy 
risk in firms targeted by hedge funds, these findings seem to suggest that 
state anti-takeover statutes make firms less “appealing” to activist hedge 
funds, as they strengthen a board’s ability to resist activists’ demands for 
short-term changes.  
Nevertheless, a shareholder advocate could interpret this evidence as 
suggesting that anti-takeover statutes weaken activists’ ability to credibly 
threaten a change in control to discipline managers and, for this reason, 
make such firms less interesting to activists. Further, unlike in the case of 
insulation measures that are adopted at firm level (e.g., a staggered board), 
activists would be less able to “fight” for the removal of state anti-takeover 
statutes, as such removal would involve the relatively rare step of 
 
 
 183. This percentage is obtained by multiplying the coefficient estimate (i.e., 0.10%) by the 
number of antitakeover statues (i.e., 6) divided by the unconditional probability of becoming a target 
(i.e., 2.07%).  
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reincorporating the firm into a state without such anti-takeover statutes or 
the even more drastic step of lobbying for legislative change. Thus, even if 
in principle activists could obtain significant gains from disciplining 
management at firms incorporated in states with more anti-takeover 
statutes, they would lack the means to do so effectively. However, even 
abstracting from the evidence on the negative wealth-impact of activism, 
this latter interpretation of the relationship between anti-takeover statutes 
and hedge fund activism seems unlikely to be accurate.  
As noted earlier, hedge fund activists are not typically strategic bidders 
aiming to acquire a control block in the companies they target.
184
 In this 
respect, Icahn’s campaign regarding Mylan is an outlier.185 More 
commonly, hedge funds seek changes through the exercise of governance 
levers, such as threatening a public campaign involving confrontation with 
the incumbent board or a proxy contest aimed at appointing new directors 
on the board, often seeking the support of institutional investors.
186
 The 
case of Pogo is thus more illustrative of typical activist tactics, as Third 
Point was able to successfully push for the sale of the company while only 
retaining about 8 percent of its stock.
187
  
Of course, undertaking these tactics does not preclude a hedge fund 
from eventually seeking, or threatening to seek, full control. In most cases, 
however, the exercise of this “ultimate threat” has been unnecessary to 
advance an activist’s agenda. This suggests that anti-takeover statutes 
should not constitute an insurmountable impediment to activist campaigns 
aimed at disciplining entrenched managers. Indeed, while these statutes 
make it more difficult for hedge funds to credibly threaten a change in 
control, they do not prevent activists from waging other actions—in 
particular, conducting a proxy contest—which are usually sufficient to 
produce changes in targeted companies. Therefore, our results on state 
anti-takeover statutes are difficult to reconcile with the managerial agency 
view that activist gains arise from better managerial discipline. 
Conversely, the limited commitment view of activism seems easier to 
reconcile with such results. Under this view, incorporation in a state that 
makes it more difficult for activists to undertake a change in control would 
signal that a firm is more likely to engage with the activists in a defensive 
fashion and resist an activist attack. Viewed this way, incorporation in 
such states would serve the function of a higher-level constraint protecting 
 
 
 184. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.  
 185. See supra notes 95–105 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
 187. See supra note 119. 
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a firm’s commitment to the long term, similar to higher-level 
constitutional constraints that are designed to protect first-level constraints 
acting on the same problems.
188
 The adoption of supermajority 
requirements for changing constitutional provisions provides a classic 
example.
189
 By hindering subsequent changes to relevant constitutional 
provisions, these requirements make those provisions meaningful. 
Similarly, incorporation in a state with anti-takeover statutes would 
strengthen a board’s commitment to the long term. This is because boards 
would be better placed to defend vigorously against the usual forms of an 
activist attack when they have less reason to fear the ultimate threat of a 
change in control.  
The results we obtain for the impact of corporate constituency statutes 
(Constituency, shown in Column (4))
190
 on future activist interventions 
further seem to support the limited commitment view of hedge fund 
activism, while correspondingly undermining the managerial agency view. 
Indeed, as compared to other anti-takeover statutes, the adoption of a 
corporate constituency statute is acknowledged as having much less 
influence in preventing a takeover.
191
 Consequently, if the shareholder 
advocates’ view that anti-takeover statutes deter hedge fund interventions 
by weakening the effectiveness of activist attacks was correct, one would 
expect firms incorporated in a state with a corporate constituency statute to 
be more likely to become a hedge fund’s target than firms incorporated in 
states with stronger anti-takeover statutes. Conversely, under the limited 
commitment view of activism, one would expect the corporate 
constituency statute to be especially valuable in strengthening a firm’s 
commitment to the long term. Indeed, while this statute may represent less 
of an impediment for the activists’ ability to threaten a change of control, 
it enables an incumbent board to resist that threat based on the 
commitment the board has undertaken toward a firm’s stakeholders (such 
as employees and creditors) rather than just the firm’s shareholders. 
Therefore, if the limited commitment view of activism is accurate, firms 
 
 
 188. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 115–18 (2000) (discussing the instruments that are 
used in the political context to safeguard constitutional commitments).  
 189. See id.; see also STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS (1995) (defending 
supermajority rules as a means to enable “ordinary politics.”).  
 190. As explained above, corporate constituency statutes authorize the use of defensive tactics to 
defend the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, such as employees or creditors. See supra note 
178. 
 191. See Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: 
Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1844, 1852 
(2002).  
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should be less likely to become a hedge fund’s target if they are 
incorporated in a state with such a statute than if they are incorporated in 
states that adopted other anti-takeover statutes.  
Our results are consistent with the second hypothesis: Constituency is 
more negatively related to a future hedge fund intervention than stronger 
anti-takeover statutes, with this effect being both statistically and 
economically significant. Specifically, a firm incorporated in a state that 
adopted a corporate constituency statute is 21% less likely to become a 
hedge fund’s target next year relative to the 2.47% unconditional 
probability in our sample.  
C. Delaware and Managerial States 
The above analysis of the relationship between anti-takeover statutes 
and activist hedge fund interventions suggests that such measures may 
strengthen a firm’s commitment to longer-term value creation, hence 
deterring future activism. In this Part, we continue to explore that 
relationship by considering the effects of incorporation in Delaware 
(indicated in our empirical results by the dummy variable Delaware 
Incorporation) on the likelihood of a future activist intervention. Indeed, 
because Delaware is the dominant state in the (re)incorporation market, it 
is more likely that it may present unobservable characteristics that may 
affect our results—suggesting that the relationship between Delaware 
incorporation and activism is worth separate examination.  
Further, Delaware only has a 3-year business combination statute (so 
that firms in our sample that are incorporated in Delaware have a State-
ATP-Index level of 1). Thus, in the empirical literature, Delaware is 
typically described as having among the mildest anti-takeover legislations 
and, hence, as being a relatively shareholder-friendly state.
192
 On this 
premise, we then also consider the relevance of incorporation in Delaware 
relative to incorporation in a set of “Managerial States” (indicated by the 
dummy Managerial State Incorporation), comprised of observation from 
17 states that have a State-ATP-Index level of 5 or 6. The largest number 
of observations comes from New York, followed by (in order of the 
number of observations) Minnesota, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Georgia, Maryland, Wisconsin and Indiana 
(plus 6 other states with relatively few observations).  
 
 
 192. See, e.g., Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 
(2001); Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001).  
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Table 2 below shows our results. Column (1) presents results for 
Delaware Incorporation, while Column 2 presents results for Managerial 
State Incorporation over the period 1995–2011.  
TABLE 2: PROBABILITY OF BECOMING A HEDGE FUND TARGET AND 
STATE OF INCORPORATION 
This table presents the marginal effects estimates from logit regressions of 
the ex-ante probability of becoming a hedge fund target next year on the 
state of incorporation and firm-level controls as of the end of this year. We 
consider the relevance of incorporation in Delaware versus in a set of 
Managerial States in the full sample (1995–2011). In the table, t-statistics 
appear between parentheses and are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. Below the t-statistics of the indicator variables for the 
state of incorporation, the percentage indicates the economic significance 
of the marginal change in the ex-ante probability of becoming a hedge 
fund target next year, arising from a change of 0 to 1 for each indicator 
variable, as a percentage of the unconditional probability in the sample 
used, which is equal to 2.07%. We control for the firm’s Tobin’s Q as well 
as the standard controls LnSize, Leverage, CAPEX, R&D, Intangibility, and 
ROA. Coefficients on standard controls are not shown in order to save 
space. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% (two-tail) test levels by ***, **, and * respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
Uncond. Prob. of becoming target next year: 2.07% 
Delaware Incorporation 0.54%***  
 (4.38)  
 +26%  
Managerial State Incorporation  -0.43%*** 
  (2.89) 
  -21% 
Tobin's Q -0.00469*** -0.00475*** 
 (7.64) (7.47) 
Standard Controls Included Yes Yes 
N 55,435 55,435 
Pseudo-R2 0.0114 0.0105 
 
Results for our logit regressions show that incorporation in Delaware 
positively predicts a hedge fund intervention in the next year, while 
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incorporation in a Managerial State negatively predicts a hedge fund 
intervention in the next year. Specifically, relative to a 2.07% 
unconditional probability that a firm in our sample might become a hedge 
fund target next year, a firm incorporated in Delaware has a 26% higher 
probability of becoming a target, while a firm incorporated in a 
Managerial State has a 21% lower probability of doing so.  
We interpret these results as consistent with our general results on the 
relationship between anti-takeover statutes and hedge fund activism shown 
in Table 1. On the one hand, Delaware, as a more shareholder-friendly 
state, would be more likely to promote future activist interventions, as 
activists would have fewer reasons to anticipate a defensive stance by the 
board of Delaware firms. On the other, Managerial States would deter 
activism, as activists would anticipate increased board hostility from firms 
incorporated in such states, which, in turn, would hinder the activists’ 
ability to pursue desired short-term changes in the target’s governance or 
business policy.  
Nevertheless, a shareholder advocate could argue that in order to draw 
conclusions about the relationship between a firm’s state of incorporation 
and hedge fund activism, one would need to investigate the association 
between firm value and state corporate law. Indeed, if incorporation into 
Delaware (which we find to facilitate activism) was associated with a 
higher firm value, this advocate would have a strong argument against our 
interpretation of the relationship between state corporate law and activist 
interventions—and, conversely, in favor of the managerial agency view of 
such interventions. The same would hold if incorporation into Managerial 
States (which we find to deter activism) were associated with a lower firm 
value. 
Two of us, however, have recently coauthored a paper on the 
association between state corporate law and firm value in which we find 
results that negate the above conjecture.
193
 In examining this association 
over the period 1994–2012 for all U.S. firms in the Compustat database, 
we find that firm value decreases when a firm reincorporates in Delaware, 
while it increases when it reincorporates in a Managerial State.
194
 Read 
against the CGSW study and the results of Table 2 above, this additional 
evidence strongly supports the limited commitment view of activism. It 
does so by suggesting that the relatively shareholder-friendly stance of 
Delaware’s law may be a possible channel through which re-incorporation 
 
 
 193. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 138. 
 194. See id. at 4, 23–25.  
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in Delaware decreases firm value, while the higher-order constraints 
provided by the laws of Managerial States against activism may explain 
why reincorporation into one of such states increases firm value.
195
  
An additional possible objection to this conclusion is that our analysis 
does not take into account that a state’s body of corporate law also consists 
of judge-made law. Under this objection, it could be argued that the 
Delaware courts’ approach to the use of defensive measures seems more 
compatible with Delaware being a managerial-friendly state than a 
shareholder-friendly one. Indeed, since the 1985 seminal decision in 
Moran v. Household International, Inc., which approved the legitimacy of 
the poison pill,
196
 Delaware courts have tilted decidedly toward upholding 
“the primacy of directorial power” in deciding whether a takeover bid 
should move forward.
197
 This argument, however, fails to fully incorporate 
the standards to which Delaware’s approval of a board’s defenses is 
conditioned, as originally established in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum 
Co.
198
 Under those standards, a board bears the burden of proving both 
that the defenses it has adopted respond to a “cognizable threat”199 and that 
such defenses are reasonable in relation to the threat posed—that is, are 
not “draconian, by being either preclusive or coercive.”200  
Further, the above argument also fails to incorporate the other relevant 
aspect of the Delaware courts’ approach to the use of defensive measures: 
the protection of the proxy contest as a safety valve the shareholders can 
use if displeased with directorial actions. Under this protection, an 
incumbent board is required to meet the “compelling justification”201 
 
 
 195. This interpretation finds further support in the evidence that the value added by 
(re)incorporation into a Managerial State increases for firms with more R&D investments, long firm-
specific relationships with important stakeholders, operating in industries requiring more specific 
investments or longer-term relationships between the corporation and stakeholders such as employees, 
customers, and suppliers. See id. at 34–36.  
 196. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
 197. See William T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the  
Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1086 (2002).  
 198. 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985).  
 199. See id. This first prong of the Unocal’s standards “is essentially a process-based review,” 
requiring directors to demonstrate that they acted in good faith and after a reasonable investigation of 
the threat. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 92 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 200. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995). A defense is coercive if it 
is “aimed at ‘cramming down’ on [the] shareholders a management-sponsored alternative.” Id. at 
1387. A defense is preclusive when success in a pending proxy contest is “realistically unattainable.” 
See Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 601 (Del. 2010). 
 201. Under this standard, Delaware courts have proscribed a variety of defensive tactics, such as 
expanding the board and filling the resulting vacancies on the eve of a proxy vote to dilute an 
insurgent’s franchise or adding a mid-proxy-contest supermajority vote requirement to foil an 
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standard established in Blasius to be allowed to use tactics that have the 
“primary purpose” of interfering with or impeding the exercise of 
shareholders’ voting rights.202 Under these limitations to the use of 
defensive measures, Delaware case law has arguably “preserved for hedge 
fund activists the right to enjoy the fruits of electoral victory.”203 Likewise, 
Delaware seems to have preserved the effectiveness of the threat of 
launching a proxy contest as a lever to obtain desired changes. Thus, a 
possible channel for the value-decreasing impact of Delaware 
reincorporation may lie with the relatively activist-friendly stance of 
Delaware courts. Nevertheless, it could be argued that this conclusion is 
drawn without considering the relationship between hedge fund activism 
and the two most common firm-level defenses a board can adopt—the 
staggered board and the poison pill. We hence turn to that examination 
next.  
D. Staggered Boards and Poison Pills  
Shareholder advocates argue that when a firm has both a staggered 
board and a poison pill in place, the safety valve of the shareholder 
franchise is more illusory than real.
204
 On the one hand, the pill would 
prevent insurgents from acquiring a controlling block of shares. On the 
other, the staggered board would prevent them from removing a majority 
of the board in one electoral round, significantly limiting an insurgent’s 
ability to remove the pill and gain voting control of the target.  
This view of staggered boards and poison pills, however, fails to 
account accurately and fully for both the changes that have occurred in the 
corporate landscape in the past fifteen years and the qualitatively different 
threat posed by hedge funds relative to corporate raiders. In light of the 
new bargaining levers acquired by shareholders, staggered boards would 
be much less “effective” in protecting a board from the threat of removal 
today, since shareholders have grown increasingly successful in coercing 
board approval of destaggering.
205
  
Further, the poison pill would provide an intrinsically less effective 
defense against the threat of an activist hedge fund campaign relative to a 
classic takeover threat. The primary consequence of a poison pill is to 
 
 
insurgent’s efforts to amend the bylaws. See, e.g., MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 
1120–21; Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 297 (Del. Ch. 2000).  
 202. Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).  
 203. See Briggs, supra note 39, at 693. 
 204. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 161, at 890, 902, 909.  
 205. See supra text accompanying notes 172–77.  
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hinder stock accumulations beyond a certain threshold.
206
 Most activists, 
however, do not aim at accumulating large blocks of a target’s stock, as 
smaller stakes (usually at around 5 to 10 percent) may be enough to wage 
an effective proxy contest for director elections, especially if an activist 
can count on the support of institutional investors, as has frequently been 
the case. Carl Icahn, for example, was not deterred by Mylan’s adoption of 
a poison pill, even though Mylan’s pill had a low ten percent threshold.207 
Additionally, similar to the case of staggered boards, activists have 
acquired sufficient bargaining power in the current corporate scenario that 
they may be able to coerce boards to remove the pill “willingly” or 
otherwise circumvent the pill. Thus, in the recent battle fought for the 
control of Sotheby’s board, the board “willingly” decided to remove a pill 
it had adopted precisely to defeat the attack of activist investor Third 
Point.
208
  
In order to test the opposite views of the relationship between the 
adoption of defensive measures and hedge fund activism, in Table 3 below 
we use a logit model to assess how the likelihood that a firm might 
become a hedge fund’s target next year is related to currently having 
adopted a staggered board and a poison pill, respectively. More 
specifically, Column (1) shows result for the adoption of a staggered board 
for our full sample of firms; Column (2) shows results for the adoption of 
a poison pill for our full sample of firms; Column (3) shows results for the 
combined defense provided by adoption of a staggered board and a poison 
pill (Staggered Board × Pill); and, finally, Column (4) shows results for 
the adoption of a staggered board among only the firms that do not also 
have a poison pill in place (Staggered Board × No Pill).   
 
 
 206. See supra note 162. 
 207. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 208. Significantly, the board’s decision took place after the board had obtained a favorable 
judgment by the Delaware Chancery Court that the use of a two-tier pill (i.e., a pill providing for 
different triggering thresholds for activists and non-activists investors) was not “preclusive.” See Third 
Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. 9469-VCP, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 64 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014).  
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TABLE 3: PROBABILITY OF BECOMING A HEDGE FUND TARGET: 
STAGGERED BOARDS AND POISON PILLS 
This table presents the marginal effects estimates from logit regressions of 
the ex-ante probability of becoming a hedge fund target next year on 
indicator variables for whether the firm has a staggered board (Staggered 
Board) and/or a poison pill (Pill) with firm-level controls as of the end of 
this year. The sample consists of the intersection of the full sample in 
Table 1 with the firms for which we have information on their board 
structure and whether they have a poison pill. In the table, t-statistics 
appear between parentheses and are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. Below the t-statistics of the indicator variables for the 
state of incorporation, the percentage indicates the economic significance 
of the marginal change in the ex-ante probability of becoming a hedge 
fund target next year, arising from a change of 0 to 1 for each indicator 
variable, relative to the percentage of the unconditional probability in the 
sample used, which is equal to 2.03%. We control for the firm’s Tobin’s Q 
as well as the standard controls LnSize, Leverage, CAPEX, R&D, 
Intangibility, and ROA. Coefficients on standard controls are not shown in 
order to save space. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels by ***, **, and * 
respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Uncond. Prob. of becoming 
target next year: 2.03% 
Staggered Board -0.44%*  -0.46%*  
 (1.81)  (1.86)  
 -22%  -23%  
Pill  -0.04% 0.04% 0.18% 
  (0.18) (0.15) (0.49) 
  -2% 2% 9% 
Staggered Board × Pill    -0.33% 
    (0.93) 
    -16% 
Staggered Board × No Pill    -0.59%* 
    (1.69) 
    -29% 
Tobin’s Q 
-1.04%*** -1.05%*** -1.05%*** -1.05%*** 
 (5.85) (5.83) (5.86) (5.85) 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
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Standard Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 12,768 12,763 12,763 12,763 
Pseudo-R2 0.0286 0.0278 0.0291 0.0292 
  
As shown by Column (1) of Table 3, firms that adopted a staggered 
board are considerably less likely to become a hedge fund’s target. This 
effect is both statistically and economically significant, with a firm that 
adopted a staggered board having a 22% lower probability of becoming a 
hedge fund target in the next year, relative to the 2.03% unconditional 
probability in our sample. Conversely, results for the adoption of a poison 
pill, shown in Column (2), are statistically insignificant. Results for the 
effect of having a staggered board combined with a poison pill, shown in 
Column (3), are similarly statistically insignificant, while the disentangled 
effect of a staggered board, shown in Column (4), is both statistically and 
economically significant. As compared to the results considering the 
adoption of a staggered board for our full sample, the adoption of a 
staggered board in firm without a poison pill is associated with an even 
larger reduction in the probability of a future hedge fund intervention. 
Indeed, a firm that has a staggered board but no poison pill has a 29% 
lower probability of becoming a hedge fund target the next year relative to 
the 2.03% unconditional probability in our sample. 
Overall, the results of Table 3 seem consistent with the anecdotal 
evidence that hedge funds are not strategic bidders, but rather prefer the 
leverage of voice, often in combination with a proxy contest, to push for 
change. This would explain why a poison pill does not seem to exert much 
influence on the likelihood of future activist interventions, as the 
effectiveness of a poison pill against a proxy contest involving an activist 
hedge fund is more limited than in the takeover context involving a 
strategic bidder.  
Importantly, this evidence also seems to challenge the conclusion by 
recent studies that have severely criticized prior empirical research 
focusing on anti-takeover statutes. In particular, these studies have claimed 
that after the introduction of the poison pill, such statutes have “added 
little, if anything, to the defensive arsenal of most firms,” because the 
adoption of a pill has equal or stronger defensive value than the anti-
takeover statutes.
209
 On the contrary, our evidence suggests that once 
hedge fund activism is added to the picture, incorporation in a state that 
 
 
 209. See Catan & Kahan, supra note 31, at 634. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 261 Cremers et al book pages2/3/2017  
 
 
 
 
 
322 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:261 
 
 
 
 
has adopted anti-takeover statutes provides a protection to incumbent 
boards that a poison pill cannot.  
As discussed earlier, the weakening effect that anti-takeover statutes 
have on the ultimate threat of a change in control does not per se prevent 
activists from successfully seeking changes in a target’s governance or 
business policy.
210
 However, this effect matters on the board’s side as it 
better positions a board to defend against potential activist attacks, making 
a board’s commitment to the long term more credible.211 Relative to anti-
takeover statutes, it is true that a poison pill may theoretically provide an 
even stronger constraint against the threat of a change of control—as the 
pill prevents the acquisition of a control block, while the statutes mostly 
tend to limit the actions an insurgent can take once she has acquired 
control.
212
 In practice, however, a board’s commitment to the long-term 
under a poison pill is likely to be less credible than under incorporation in 
a state with anti-takeover statutes, as avoiding a state statute requires 
taking steps that are more costly to activists than avoiding or working 
around the defense provided by the pill. In other words, in the current 
corporate landscape where activists have grown increasingly able to 
coerce board approval to remove the pill or otherwise circumvent this 
defense,
213
 the adoption of a pill would no longer offer a higher-level 
constraint to protect a board’s commitment to the long term, in the same 
way incorporation in a state with anti-takeover statutes does.  
Concerning the adoption of a staggered board, two possible 
complementary explanations may account for the strong deterrent effect 
highlighted by the results presented in Table 3. First, a staggered board, 
unlike a poison pill, is a defense premised on shareholder consent.
214
 This 
“bilateral” nature of the staggered board seems to strengthen our 
hypothesis that a defensive measure is effective in deterring future activist 
intervention only as long as it can credibly signal to activists a firm’s 
commitment to long-term value creation. When this commitment is 
premised on shareholder consent, it would be naturally more credible than 
when it comes exclusively from the board. This is because measures that 
 
 
 210. See supra Part IV.A. 
 211. See id. 
 212. See Catan & Kahan, supra note 31, at 638–39.  
 213. See supra notes 202–04. 
 214. In Delaware, and most other states, shareholder approval is required to adopt a staggered 
board after the initial charter or bylaws are in place. JASON D. MONTGOMERY, INV’R RESPONSIBILITY 
RESEARCH CTR., CLASSIFIED BOARDS 4 (1998); see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2015). The 
notable exception is Maryland, where the board has unilateral power to adopt a staggered board. See 
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 3-803 (LexisNexis 2015). 
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can be unilaterally adopted by the board, such as the poison pill, would be 
more likely to reflect a willingness of the directors to entrench themselves 
than a “real” commitment to the long term.215 Accordingly, activists could 
anticipate less board resistance upon the adoption of unilateral defensive 
measures relative to bilateral measures. Nonetheless, and again in contrast 
with what one would expect to find under the managerial agency view of 
activism, activists seem to remain indifferent to the higher likelihood of 
entrenchment signaled by a pill relative to a staggered board.  
Second, a staggered board produces effects that bear directly on the 
acquisition of voting control, rather than the acquisition of a control block. 
Given hedge funds’ preferences for the use of the proxy route in their 
activist campaigns, this could explain why the staggered board is better 
equipped to provide effective deterrence against future activist 
interventions.  
Under either explanation, however, if it is true that the ability of 
activists to pressure boards to dismiss a pill may help explain why the pill 
no longer provides an effective higher-level constraint to protect a board’s 
commitment to the long term, we would expect to find that the deterrent 
effect of staggered boards could be similarly weakened in circumstances 
where activists can more easily coerce a board’s approval to destagger. 
Based on the results we obtain for the relationship between incorporation 
in Delaware versus a Managerial State and the likelihood of a future hedge 
fund intervention, we thus conjecture that the adoption of a staggered 
board provides an effective impediment against activism only as long as it 
is complemented by the support provided by incorporation into a 
Managerial State. In such a case, the anticipation by activists of a credible 
board commitment to long-term value creation would induce activists to 
anticipate greater resistance against proposals to destagger the board. 
Conversely, the adoption of a staggered board in a relatively activist-
friendly state such as Delaware would be less effective in deterring future 
activist interventions, as activists would rate destaggering proposals to be 
more likely to succeed within this legal environment.  
 
 
 215. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 9, at 101–03 (documenting that defensive measures that can 
be unilaterally adopted by the board tend to be associated with reduced firm value and hence seem 
more likely to be motivated by an entrenchment purpose than a commitment one); Ronald J. Gilson, 
Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51, 51 
(1982) (suggesting that defensive tactics which require shareholder approval, such as staggered boards, 
may represent an efficient commitment from shareholders to managers and boards not to dismiss these 
agents prematurely, but nothing that tactics that do not require board approval may inefficiently reduce 
shareholder value).  
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In order to test this further conjecture, in Table 4 below we show 
results from using a logit model to estimate the likelihood that a firm with 
a staggered board might become a hedge fund’s target next year 
conditional on the firm being incorporated in (i) Delaware (DE in Column 
(1)), (ii) a state other than Delaware (not DE in Column (2)), (iii) a 
Managerial State (MS in Column (3)), and (iv) a state other than a 
Managerial State (Not MS in Column (4)).  
TABLE 4: PROBABILITY OF BECOMING A HEDGE FUND TARGET: 
STAGGERED BOARDS AND STATE OF INCORPORATION 
This table presents the marginal effects estimates from logit regressions of 
the ex-ante probability of becoming a hedge fund target next year on an 
indicator variable for whether the firm has a staggered board with firm-
level controls as of the end of this year. The sample consists of the 
intersection of the full sample in Table 1 with the firms for which we have 
information on their board structure and whether they have a poison pill. 
Each column considers a different sub-sample: DE considers only firms 
incorporated in Delaware, Not DE considers all firms not incorporated in 
Delaware, MS considers only firms incorporated in a group of Managerial 
States, and Not MS considers all firms not incorporated in the group of 
Managerial States. In the table, t-statistics appear between parentheses and 
are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. Below the t-statistics 
of the indicator variables for the state of incorporation, the percentage 
indicates the economic significance of the marginal change in the ex-ante 
probability of becoming a hedge fund target next year, arising from a 
change of 0 to 1 for the staggered board indicator variable, as a percentage 
of the unconditional probability in the sample used, which is 2.1%. We 
control for the firm’s Tobin’s Q as well as the standard controls LnSize, 
Leverage, CAPEX, R&D, Intangibility and ROA. Coefficients on standard 
controls are not shown in order to save space. Statistical significance of the 
coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels by 
***, **, and * respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firms incorporated in: DE Not DE MS Not MS 
Uncond. Prob. of becoming target 
next year: 1.99% 2.10% 2.16% 2.07% 
Staggered Board -0.14% -0.91%*** -1.43%*** -0.13% 
 (0.43) (2.33) (2.49) (0.44) 
 -7% -43% -66% -6% 
Tobin’s Q -0.82%*** -1.51%*** -1.54%*** -0.99%*** 
 (3.68) (6.14) (4.33) (4.73) 
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Standard Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,529 5,239 2,735 10,033 
Pseudo-R2 0.0279 0.038 0.0485 0.0293 
 
Consistent with our conjecture, Table 4 shows that the deterrent effect 
of staggered boards on hedge fund activism is entirely driven by a firm’s 
incorporation into a Managerial State—or, more generally, a state other 
than Delaware. As shown in Column (1), the adoption of a staggered 
board in a firm incorporated into Delaware has no statistically significant 
association with the likelihood of a future hedge fund intervention. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis that hedge fund activists anticipate a 
staggered board to be less of an impediment in Delaware, as destaggering 
proposals would have better chances under Delaware’s relative activist-
friendly legal environment.  
Conversely, incorporation in a state other than Delaware, as shown in 
Column (2), is associated with a considerable increase in the anti-activism 
force of a staggered board, with the related effect being both statically and 
economically significant. Specifically, a firm with a staggered board in 
place and incorporated in a state other than Delaware has a 43% lower 
probability of becoming a hedge fund target next year relative to a 2.1% 
unconditional probability in our sample of firms not incorporated into 
Delaware.  
The most significant result, though, is that of Column (3), which 
documents that a firm with a staggered board in place and incorporated 
into a Managerial State has a 66% lower probability of becoming a hedge 
fund target next year relative to a 2.16% unconditional probability in our 
sample of firms incorporated in a Managerial State. This is consistent with 
our hypothesis that hedge fund activists anticipate a staggered board to be 
a major impediment in a Managerial State, as boards of firms that 
incorporated into a state with a managerial-friendly legislation can be 
expected to be more likely to oppose a destaggering proposal. Finally, this 
result is also confirmed by the evidence in Column 4, which shows that 
the effect of having a staggered board for firms that are not incorporated 
into a Managerial State is insignificant.  
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS  
As highlighted in the Introduction, the debate over the effects of hedge 
fund activism stand at the center of the broader, and fundamental, 
corporate law debate over the optimal allocation of power between boards 
and shareholders. Based on the evidence that hedge fund activism is 
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followed by long-term benefits to targeted firms, Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang 
argued that legal rules and governance arrangements should promote 
stronger shareholder rights and thereby facilitate activist interventions.
216
 
The combined empirical evidence documented by the CGSW study and 
this work, however, suggests differently.  
This evidence shows that it is essential to incorporate selection effects 
of hedge fund activism, which target primarily underperforming firms. 
Once one uses a comparative approach, activist hedge funds emerge as 
exacerbating the limited commitment problem, without seemingly 
compensating for this effect through increased managerial accountability, 
thus resulting in negative implications for sustainable firm growth. 
Contrary to the arguments of shareholder advocates, this evidence 
indicates that concerns about the detrimental long-term effects of hedge 
fund activism are warranted. It also suggests that policymakers and 
institutional investors would do well to reconsider the direction of 
corporate governance policies and practices, specifically towards 
recommendations that help constrain the short-term distortions arguably 
produced by hedge fund activism. 
To this end, in this Part, we explore two possible paths for reform. We 
first consider proposals that have been advanced to “fix the activists”—
i.e., to induce hedge funds to internalize the long-term consequences of the 
changes they seek in a firm’s corporate governance and investment policy. 
Our concern with these proposals is mainly of a pragmatic nature, since it 
is unclear whether their implementation would be feasible in the current 
political environment. We next argue that a more practical route to redress 
current inefficiencies would involve re-empowering U.S. corporate boards. 
Board power and shareholder power are balancing vessels, as increasing 
one necessarily means reducing the other. In recent years, the gains made 
by shareholders in general, and activists in particular, have increasingly 
eroded board authority over the corporation. Hence, recalibrating the 
balance of power to restore the authority boards of directors have 
historically held in U.S. corporate law would help “fix” both targets and 
activists, while offering the advantage of involving less drastic, and hence 
more feasible, changes. In particular, as we discuss below, our empirical 
findings indicate that a straightforward—and relatively parsimonious—
way to re-empower U.S. corporate boards would be to restore their ability 
to use defensive measures such as staggered boards to effectively secure a 
firm’s commitment to long-term value creation. 
 
 
 216. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 4, at 1091, 1148, 1155. 
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A. Fixing the Activists 
Among the various reform proposals advanced in recent years to 
address the short-term distortions engendered by activist hedge funds, 
there are proposals to amend the tax treatment of long-term capital gains, 
introduce voting rights limitations, and expand SEC disclosure 
requirements have occupied the center-stage. 
Recommendations for the adoption of tax strategies designed to modify 
the current treatment of reduced tax rates for long-term capital gains have 
come from academics,
217
 international think-tanks,
218
 market 
participants,
219
 and even political circles.
220
 These recommendations share 
the common view that amending the tax code to require longer-term 
holdings to benefit from reduced long-term tax rates for capital gains 
would introduce a beneficial form of Pigouvian taxation, deterring “hit-
and-run” activists. To the point, in a post on the Harvard Law School 
Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation published in 
February 2014, Carl Icahn dismissed the accusation that activists seek 
speedy profits, because they “do not enjoy paying short-term capital gains 
tax rates.”221 What he did not tell, however, is that under current tax laws a 
one-year investment is already considered a long-term investment.
222
 Icahn 
also omitted to specify that the current average holding period for activist 
hedge funds is less than a year.
223
  
Thus, a regressive tax regime for the allocation of long-term capital-
gains benefits could be desirable to moderate the current pressure exerted 
by activists for short-term changes and sudden corporate governance 
 
 
 217. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading, 3 J. FIN. 
SERVS. RES. 101, 109 (1989).  
 218. See ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE 
APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 3 (2009), http://www.aspeninstitute.org/ 
sites/default/files/content/docs/bsp/overcome_short_state0909.pdf. 
 219. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, BlackRock’s Chief, Laurence Fink, Urges Other C.E.O.s to Stop 
Being So Nice to Investors, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/04/14/business/dealbook/blackrocks-chief-laurence-fink-urges-other-ceos-to-stop-being-so-nice-
to-investors.html?_r=0 (reporting content of an April 2015 letter by Larry Fink, the CEO of Blackrock, 
the largest asset manager worldwide, to the CEOs of five hundred of the nation’s largest companies, in 
which Fink proposed to reform the tax code to cut subsidies for short-term investments and suggested 
that an investment should only qualify as long-term if it lasts for a minimum period of three years). 
 220. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Clinton Aim Is to Thwart Quick Buck on Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, July 
28, 2015, at B1. 
 221. Carl Icahn, Will the New Shareholder-Director Exchange Achieve Its Potential?, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 13, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/ 
02/13/will-the-new-shareholder-director-exchange-achieve-its-potential/. 
 222. See 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 223. Brav et al., supra note 75, at 204 tbl.4.2, panel C. 
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transitions. Nevertheless, we are unsure that a reform of the tax code 
would be politically feasible, at least not any time soon.
224
  
An additional proposal that has gained traction in academic circles 
considers the possibility of introducing corporate governance 
arrangements that would calibrate shareholders’ voting rights 
proportionally to the length of ownership. Under this proposal, 
shareholders who keep shares for longer periods would benefit from 
increased voting power and, correspondingly, shareholders holding shares 
for shorter periods would be penalized by less voting power.
225
 Anchoring 
the exercise of shareholder governance to the length of a shareholder’s 
investment horizon, this proposal would prevent hedge funds from 
exploiting the corporate voting system as a lever to seek short-termist 
changes.  
On the other hand, however, recommendations to modify voting rights 
arrangements seem to suffer from both feasibility issues and potential 
inefficiencies. First, as long as the proposed arrangements affect all 
shareholders, it is unclear how this reform would impact other 
fundamental business decisions such as the approval of a merger requiring 
a supermajority vote. Conversely, if these modifications were limited to 
only some categories of shareholders, establishing practical criteria to 
distinguish one category from the other would be problematic. Perhaps 
more importantly, limiting shareholders’ voting rights in the short term 
could have unwanted effects, as it would deprive shareholders committed 
to a long-term investment of the means needed to engage with the firm and 
advocate for implementing desirable changes and, therefore, could deter 
the pursuit of optimal investments. 
Proposals for early Schedule 13D disclosure requirements
226—and, 
more generally, to tighten existing disclosure requirements for activist 
investors
227—seem easier to implement and would be desirable to both 
 
 
 224. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 29, at 595. 
 225. See Patrick Bolton & Frédéric Samama, L-Shares: Rewarding Long-Term Investors 9–11 
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 342/2013, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2188661; Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are Shareholders?, 
HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2012, https://hbr.org/2012/07/what-good-are-shareholders. For a similar 
proposal, see COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW 
TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT 206–14 (2013). 
 226. See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Petition for Rulemaking Under Section 13 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, RM No. 4-624 (Mar. 7, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/ 
2011/petn4-624.pdf; Adam O. Emmerich et al., Fair Markets and Fair Disclosure: Some Thoughts on 
the Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, and the Use and Abuse of Shareholder Power, 3 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 135, 137–40 (2013). 
 227. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 157, at 499 (theorizing about the adoption of a system where 
“[t]here was complete, up-to-date information about the economic interests of stockholders who have 
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promote greater transparency among investors and eliminate the incentives 
for potentially abusive tactics allowed by the current ten-day reporting 
window.
228
 In response to this proposal, shareholder advocates have 
argued that tightening existing disclosure requirements would lead to a 
reduction in activist engagements.
229
 They further argue that “[w]hether 
such a reduction would be detrimental or beneficial depends, in turn, on 
the validity of the myopic-activists claim,”230 that is, on whether hedge 
fund activism is associated with decreased or increased firm value in the 
long term.  
We agree that this may be the right way of framing the issue, although 
it is not clear to us why a shorter reporting window would deter activists 
committed to interventions that create long-term value. Since the market is 
unlikely to anticipate the full value of those interventions, a shorter 
reporting window should not have a substantial impact on long-term hedge 
fund campaigns. Conversely, such a change would matter for arbitrageurs 
who speculate on short-term price differences connected to an activist 
intervention. In any event, we disagree that the empirical evidence 
supports the shareholder advocates’ conclusion that “hedge fund activism 
is associated with beneficial long-term consequences.”231 As the combined 
results of the CGSW study and this work document, hedge fund activism 
seems associated with negative long-term effects on targeted firms when it 
is examined through an appropriate matching methodology. Thus, while 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) currently seems to have 
taken a step back from earlier plans to reexamine disclosure 
requirements,
232
 these results should inform any future examination of the 
subject by the Commission.   
 
 
to file under Schedule 13D”); Coffee & Palia, supra note 29, at 95 (proposing to redefine the concept 
of “group” for disclosure requirements).  
 228. Section 13(d) of Regulation 13D of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 does not require 
filing the disclosure requirement triggered by the acquisition of beneficial ownership of more than 5% 
of a company’s shares until ten days after the acquisition of this ownership interest. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13d-1(a) (2012).  
 229. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder 
Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 47–51 (2012); see also Joshua Gallu, Secret Corporate Raids to 
Become Harder Under SEC Rule Revision, CORP. COUNS. Mar. 7, 2011, at 2, 2 (quoting William 
Ackman as saying that closing the ten-day window would decrease the number of activist investors). 
 230. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 4, at 1153. 
 231. Id.  
 232. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence 
and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 3 n.3 (2013) (quoting the SEC’s website). 
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B. Fixing the Target  
While a broad range of policy measures have been proposed with the 
intent of “fixing the activists,” surprisingly few proposals have considered 
the possibility of intervening on the target’s side by re-empowering 
boards. This lack of proposals favoring enhanced board authority seems 
largely a product of the view that doing so might compromise the potential 
beneficial effects of activism as a disciplinary device—a view held even 
among those who accept that such effects bear their own costs.
233
 Our 
empirical findings, however, suggest that this is an overrated concern. 
Hedge fund activism does not seem to bring about more managerial 
accountability and, in any event, its negative effects on the shareholders’ 
limited commitment problem—and hence the risk of short-termism—
emerge as largely dominant. Viewed through this lens, reforms designed 
to re-empower boards with the necessary authority to resist activist hedge 
fund interventions should not be regarded as limiting the rights of 
shareholders as a collective, but rather as enabling the efficient exercise of 
those rights towards long-term, rather than short-term, value creation.
234
  
The diminished ability of boards of directors to use defensive measures 
effectively to gain protection from short-termist tactics provides the 
clearest manifestation of the current trend toward the erosion of board 
power in favor of shareholders in general and activists in particular. 
Contrary to the shareholder advocates’ view that holds these defenses as 
highly effective to protect incumbents, both staggered boards and poison 
pills no longer seem to be as effective in practice.
235
 As a result, these 
defenses are no longer sufficient to credibly secure a board’s commitment 
to long-term value creation.  
The issue presents itself most vividly for the staggered board. Given 
the activists’ preference for, and ability to successfully exploit, the proxy 
contest system, the staggered board would seem to be the most effective 
defense to counteract activist hedge fund campaigns, as the primary effect 
of a staggered board is to delay an activist’s ability to secure voting 
control through a proxy fight. In principle, this delay effect should help 
 
 
 233. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Eclipse of the Shareholder Paradigm 69 
(Jan. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (recognizing the cost of shareholder 
empowerment, but defending activist hedge fund interventions as “a sort of test that enriches the 
market’s base of information”); Coffee & Palia, supra note 29, at 85 (suggesting that the solutions to 
the distortions induced by hedge fund activism need to avoid insulating managers). 
 234. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 635, 639–42 
(1991) (discussing the enabling features of constitutional constraints). 
 235. See supra text accompanying notes 172–77, 205–08. 
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deter “hit-and-run” activists, by forcing activists to stick with a 
corporation for at least two-election cycles before gaining board control, 
hence committing the activist to a longer-term investment. Today, 
however, as indicated by our results, the defensive value of the staggered 
board to discourage activist campaigns seems considerably reduced—at 
least for the large majority of U.S. corporations incorporated in Delaware.  
In response to this state of affairs, we argue that restoring the 
commitment value of staggered boards, and other defensive mechanisms, 
towards long-term value creation is a necessary first step to re-empower 
U.S. boards. Pragmatically, this requires measures that can secure the 
effectiveness of the staggered board as a means to grant directors 
protection from the threat of short-term removal. As an implementation 
matter, what forms these measures should take is likely to depend on 
whether heavyweight players such as institutional investors will side with 
activist investors, as they have frequently done in the past,
236
 or take steps 
to support a corporation’s boards and management, as recent signs suggest 
they might do.
237
  
In the first case, as two of us have argued elsewhere, a legal response 
designed to turn the staggered board into a quasi-mandatory provision 
would be desirable in order to prevent activists from being able to coerce 
board approval to destagger or otherwise circumvent the staggered board’s 
delay effect.
238
 In brief, under this proposal, the board should have 
exclusive authority to initiate a charter amendment to opt out of a state-
mandated staggered board default, while the shareholders’ right to present 
a destaggering proposal should be limited.
239
 This would substantially 
reduce the leverage that activist shareholders currently have against boards 
and, in turn, reduce the risk of coerced board approval to destagger. For 
added protection, and in order to ensure widespread shareholder agreement 
to board destaggering against unilateral activist pressure, the decision to 
remove a staggered board should also be subject to a charter-based two-
thirds supermajority requirement.
240
 
 
 
 236. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 237. See infra notes 238–39. 
 238. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 9, at 75, 138–39. A quasi-mandatory rule would provide for 
a “sticky default” to block the “more socially problematic opt-outs,” that is, proposals for destaggering 
initiated by the shareholders while coercing board approval. Conversely, it would not block the “less 
socially problematic opt-outs,” which include destaggering proposals initiated by the board itself and 
approved by a large majority of shareholders. See id. at 138; see also Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: 
An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2086–87 (2012) (introducing the concept 
of sticky default). 
 239. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 9, at 139. 
 240. See id. 
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A less radical private-ordering response, however, could suffice if 
institutional investors decided to turn the tide back on hedge fund 
activism. Breaking old patterns, institutional investors have recently gone 
on the record to voice short-termist concerns about activist hedge fund 
interventions
241
 and, more importantly, voted against activist proposals 
and in favor of incumbents.
242
 Focusing on these developments, some 
commentators have begun to refer to 2015 as an “inflection year,” 
suggesting that a more balanced corporate governance paradigm might 
already be emerging.
243
 If this prediction proves accurate, a primary 
beneficial effect we could expect to witness is a decrease in (or an end to) 
the current destaggering trend. Indeed, as the support of institutional 
investors for hedge fund activisms has often significantly contributed to 
the hedge funds’ ability to successfully carry out their interventions, the 
withdrawal of this support would weaken the funds’ bargaining power vis-
à-vis boards while strengthening the force of board defenses.  
Hedge funds, however, have already developed activist tactics that rely 
less on the support of other institutional investors, such as the “wolf 
pack”—under which several hedge funds join forces acting loosely in 
parallel fashion, while carefully avoiding forming a “group” for purposes 
of federal securities laws.
244
 The advantage of this tactic is to allow hedge 
funds to circumvent triggering earlier disclosure obligations about their 
stake in the target and their future intentions, enabling the “wolf pack” to 
quietly accumulate substantially larger stakes in target companies and 
thereby gain correspondingly stronger bargaining power vis-à-vis 
incumbent boards.
 
Hence, the proposal for measures that can strengthen 
the defensive force of staggered boards and other protecting 
 
 
 241. In the letter he sent to U.S. CEOs, Blackrock CEO Larry Fink expressed concerns that the 
search for short-term gains is harming the creation of long-term value and, therefore, both U.S. 
companies and their investors. See Sorkin, supra note 219. Statements of similar tone and content have 
also recently come from F. William McNabb III, Chairman and CEO of Vanguard, another one of the 
biggest players in the institutional investor landscape, and Anne Simpson, Director of Corporate 
Governance and a senior portfolio manager of CalPERS, the nation’s largest pension fund by assets. 
See Martin Lipton, Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2016, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 9, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/12/09/some-
thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2016/. 
 242. Most notably, in May 2015, Blackrock, State Street, and Vanguard sided with DuPont in its 
proxy fight against activist hedge fund Trian Fund, offering the company decisive support. See Justin 
Lahart, Why Peltz Didn’t Have Icahn’s Apple Touch, WALL ST. J.: HEARD ON THE STREET (May 22, 
2015, 10:15 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-peltz-didnt-have-icahns-apple-touch-1432322488. 
 243. See Martin Lipton, Is 2015, Like 1985, an Inflection Year?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 8, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/12/08/is-2015-like-
1985-an-inflection-year/. 
 244. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 29, at 28–39; Carmen X.W. Lu, Unpacking Wolf Packs, 125 
YALE L.J. 773 (2016). 
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mechanisms—such as, for example, a charter-based supermajority 
requirement for approval of destaggering—would remain beneficial even 
under a market adjustment that saw institutional investors increasingly 
siding with directors rather than activist hedge funds.  
One possible concern with our recommendations is whether enhancing 
the force of current defensive measures would raise issues under any of 
the standards applied by Delaware courts to evaluate the legitimacy of 
such measures.
245
 In principle, it should not. The adoption of a staggered 
board, even combined with a supermajority voting requirement for its 
removal, does not by itself trigger the Unocal standards of draconian 
measures. A staggered board only reduces the number of candidates that 
will be elected at the annual shareholder meeting, weakening a hedge 
fund’s bargaining levers by hindering access to the board and the exercise 
of voting control. It neither contains coercive features that have an effect 
on how the votes themselves are cast nor makes the likelihood of success 
in a proxy contest “realistically unattainable.”246 The adoption of a 
staggered board also does not by itself trigger the Blasius standard, since it 
does not reduce the effectiveness of the shareholder vote.
247
 Similarly, 
while the adoption of a pill magnifies the importance of the delay effect 
induced by the adoption of a staggered board—as this combined defense 
delays the acquisition of both a control block and voting control—it does 
not by itself trigger the preclusivity standard, as established by the 
Delaware Supreme Court in 2010 in Versata Enterprises v. Selectica 
Inc.
248
  
In practice, however, it is conceivable that the specific circumstances 
of the case and the combination of defenses used by a target to fend off an 
activist attack may trigger any of the above standards. For example, the 
delay effect of a staggered board is substantially strengthened if the 
corporation has adopted a cumulative voting procedure for the election of 
directors. This procedure strengthens the delay effect by allowing 
shareholders to cast all of their votes for a single board nominee when the 
company has multiple openings on its board.  
To offer a concrete illustration, consider the case where an activist is 
expected to control the majority of the votes (say two thirds) and the 
incumbent directors only the minority (say one third). Assume that the 
corporation has a staggered board of nine directors with three classes. 
 
 
 245. See supra text accompanying notes 192–99. 
 246. See supra note 196. 
 247. See supra note 198. 
 248. See Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 604 (Del. 2010).  
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Under a straight-voting system, the activist could get control of the board 
after two elections as she could appoint three directors at the first election 
and other three at the subsequent election. With cumulative voting, 
instead, the activist will need to wait until the third election cycle to get 
control of the board, as she will only be able to elect two directors at each 
annual election. If the board introduced cumulative voting upon learning 
of an activist attack, especially if in combination with a low threshold pill, 
we cannot exclude that the defense could be found to be preclusive or even 
to violate the Blasius standard.  
In response, we argue that it would be desirable for Delaware courts to 
consider the type of insurgent that is involved in the transaction motivating 
the introduction of a defensive measure, and adopt more lenient standards 
to evaluate the board’s use of defensive measures when the threat comes 
from an activist hedge fund. Absent the ability to respond to an activist 
attack with potentially draconian measures, a board might well lack the 
means to fend off such an attack. This suggestion seems consistent with 
the approach adopted by Delaware courts in some recent cases involving 
activists with a reputation for only short-term interests in the companies 
they target, or an attack by a wolf pack, where the chancellors have held 
boards to a lower burden for establishing the reasonableness of defensive 
actions.
249
  
CONCLUSION  
This Article empirically examines whether hedge fund activism may 
have heterogeneous effects, i.e., produce beneficial long-term effects on 
the managerial moral hazard front that offset the negative long-term 
effects it bears for the shareholders’ limited commitment problem and the 
risk of short-termism. The evidence we document on the relationship 
existing between activist hedge fund interventions, on the one hand, and 
corporate risk-taking, executive compensation, and the adoption of 
defensive measures, on the other, is inconsistent with the hypothesis of 
heterogeneity in the effects of activism.  
Contrary to what shareholder advocates assert, and in spite of the 
activists’ propaganda, the substantial private gains realized by hedge funds 
through activism do not seem to reflect a particular ability of these 
investors to activate management teams. Rather, hedge funds seem to 
 
 
 249. See, e.g., Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. 9469-VCP, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 64 (Del. Ch. 
May 2, 2014); In re Ebix, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 8526-VCN, 2016 WL 208402 (Del. Ch. Jan. 15, 
2016). 
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primarily focus on targets where they expect to find less board resistance 
to short-termist changes in corporate governance and business policy that 
typically accompany activists’ campaigns. Thus, hedge fund interventions 
result in increased risk-taking, but do not appear to change the structure of 
managerial incentives.  
Further weakening the view that hedge funds bring about increased 
managerial accountability, the funds also seem indifferent to defensive 
measures that are more troubling from an entrenchment perspective, such 
as poison pills that boards can unilaterally adopt. Conversely, and 
consistent with the view that hedge funds primarily act to exploit the 
short-term information inefficiencies of financial markets, activist hedge 
fund campaigns are deterred by measures that delay their ability to 
command corporate changes and, hence, commit them to a longer-term 
investment. These measures include “effective” staggered boards, which 
this Article has shown presently means a staggered board that is combined 
with other devices that than can prevent “easy” ex-post destaggering by 
activists—such as the incorporation in states with more anti-takeover 
statutes and that are, thus, more managerial friendly. 
Concerns about the detrimental long-term effects of hedge fund 
activism are thus warranted. Policymakers and institutional investors 
should give serious consideration to the introduction of measures designed 
to reduce the room of arbitrage for short-term activist interventions. 
Likewise, corporate law rules and common law courts should favorably 
consider defensive measures that enable boards to resist attacks by 
activists lacking long-term “skin in the game.” 
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APPENDIX TABLE A 
Activist Hedge Fund Campaigns and Bankruptcy Risk 
This table presents the coefficient estimates from pooled OLS regressions. 
The dependent variable is –Z-Score, a proxy for bankruptcy risk. The 
hedge fund data is from the updated dataset used in Brav et al. (2008) and 
covers the period 1995 to 2011. Firm-level data are from Compustat for 
the period 1995–2011. The sample includes firms targeted by hedge funds 
and control firms (identified using the Abadie-Imbens matching estimator 
described in the CGSW study). “t” is an indicator equal to one for the year 
in which a firm is targeted by a hedge fund, and zero for every other year 
before or after the targeting event year. This indicator is also equal to one 
for the matched control firm. “HF_Target × t to t+3” is an indicator equal 
to one for firms targeted by a hedge fund in the year of the targeting event 
and in the three years thereafter, and zero for every year before or after 
year t+3. “HF_Target × t to t+3” is always equal to zero for the matched-
control pairs (firms not targeted by a hedge fund). The other time dummies 
are defined similarly. We restrict the sample to non-financial firms. In the 
table, t-statistics appear in brackets and are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. Standard controls include LnSize, Leverage, Capex, 
R&D and Intangibility. Coefficients on standard controls are not shown in 
order to save space. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels by ***, **, and * 
respectively. 
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Dep. Var.: –Z-Score  (1) (2) 
t-4 to t-1 0.330*** 0.223** 
 (3.60) (2.09) 
t to t+3 0.256** 0.133 
 (2.30) (0.98) 
Post t+3 -0.201 -0.266 
 (1.18) (1.41) 
HF_Target × t-4 to t-1 0.0993 0.0375 
 (0.85) (0.26) 
HF_Target × t to t+3 0.389*** 0.257 
 (3.16) (1.59) 
HF_Target × Post t+3 0.419** 0.277 
 (2.33) (1.26) 
4-digit SIC Industry-FE Yes No 
Firm-FE No Yes 
Year-FE Yes Yes 
Other controls included Yes Yes 
Obs. 25,795 25,795 
R-2 0.228 0.180 
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APPENDIX TABLE B 
Activist Hedge Fund Campaigns and CEO Compensation 
This table presents the coefficient estimates from pooled OLS regressions. 
The dependent variable in Column (1) is Log CEO Total Compensation, in 
Column (2) is the CEO Pay Slice, in Column (3) is the CEO Delta, and in 
Column (4) is CEO Vega. The hedge fund data is from the updated dataset 
used in Brav et al. (2008) and covers the period 1995 to 2011. Firm-level 
data are from Compustat for the period 1995–2011.The sample includes 
firms targeted by hedge funds and control firms (identified using the 
Abadie-Imbens matching estimator described in CGSW). “t” is an 
indicator equal to one for the year in which a firm is targeted by a hedge 
fund, and zero for every other year before or after the targeting event year. 
This indicator is also equal to one for the matched control firm. 
“HF_Target × t to t+3” is an indicator equal to one for firms targeted by a 
hedge fund in the year of the targeting event and in the three years 
thereafter, and zero for every year before or after year t+3. “HF_Target × t 
to t+3” is always equal to zero for the matched-control pairs (firms not 
targeted by a hedge fund). The other time dummies are defined similarly. 
We restrict the sample to non-financial firms. In the table, t-statistics 
appear in brackets and are based on robust standard errors clustered by 
firm. Standard controls include LnSize, Leverage, Capex, R&D and 
Intangibility. Coefficients on standard controls are not shown in order to 
save space. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels by ***, **, and * respectively. 
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Dep. Var. : 
Log CEO  
Total Comp. 
CEO Pay  
Slice 
CEO  
Delta 
CEO 
Vega 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
t-4 to t-1 0.00148 -0.00466 -0.140 -0.0456 
 (0.06) (-0.73) (-0.54) (-0.81) 
t to t+3 -0.00404 -0.00808 -0.321 -0.127 
 (-0.11) (-0.90) (-0.80) (-1.59) 
Post t+3 0.00340 0.0182 -0.0337 -0.125 
 (0.07) (1.45) (-0.06) (-1.12) 
HF_Target × t-4 to t-1 -0.0192 0.00882 -0.144 0.0487 
 (-0.47) (1.02) (-0.35) (0.57) 
HF_Target × t to t+3 -0.0204 0.00844 0.0868 0.00836 
 (-0.38) (0.76) (0.18) (0.07) 
HF_Target × Post t+3 -0.0858 -0.00682 0.587 0.0706 
 (-1.37) (-0.55) (0.96) (0.48) 
Firm-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 6,596 6,596 6,462 5,857 
R-2 0.758 0.369 0.688 0.720 
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